674 GEORGEBERKELEY
I do. Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not
deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the mind.
HYLAS: Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.
PHILONOUS: Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have
seen things produced into being—that is become perceptible—in the order prescribed by
the sacred historian. I never before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now
find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their
existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eter-
nally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind:
but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible
to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds.
Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several
parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper
faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This
is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which
is included no mention, or no thought, either of substratum,instrument, occasion, or
absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest
men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What meta-
physical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.
HYLAS: But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things,
in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say,
upon supposition there were men to perceive them; without which they have no actuality
of absolute existence, wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to
you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of
man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?
PHILONOUS: In answer to that, I say,first,created beings might begin to exist in the
mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove
any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first show there was no
other order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we con-
ceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts
produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present—that this way
of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of
nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural,
and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on
God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that
important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and
resigned to their great creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things,
divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the actuality of
absolute existence.You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our
dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then
tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.
HYLAS: I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you to
this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind?
And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from
all eternity, according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time?
Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?
PHILONOUS: And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?
HYLAS: I am.
PHILONOUS: Consequently they always had a being in the divine intellect.