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admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the
present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause,
beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or
propriety, add anything to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause.
Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather,
which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the
security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the
course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards
the virtuous with honour and success, in all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the
course itself of events, which lies open to every one’s inquiry and examination. I acknowl-
edge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than
vice, and meets with a more favour able reception from the world. I am sensible, that,
according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and
moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the
virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind, every
advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your
suppositions and reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds
from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on
which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in
life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my
experience of past events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, and
a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular
reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events; I here
find the same fallacy, which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining,
that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely
infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by argu-
ing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all
your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every
argument, deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is
impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have antecedently, not
inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect.
But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who, instead of
regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far
reverse the whole course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something
farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue,
which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence,
do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own
conceit and imagination surely. For if they derived it from the present phenomena, it
would never point to anything farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the
divinity may possiblybe endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted,
may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be satisfied: all
this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere possibilityand hypothesis. We never
can have reason to inferany attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as
we know them to have been exerted and satisfied.
Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world?If you answer in the affir-
mative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the neg-
ative, I conclude, that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the
gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the justice of