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him; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we
know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impos-
sible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities, which
we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it is impossible they
could point to anything further, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of
a foot in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some figure
adapted to it, by which it was produced: but the print of a human foot proves likewise,
from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which also left its
impression, though effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to
the cause; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect; but this is
not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a
hundred other experiences and observations, concerning the usualfigure and members
of that species of animal, without which this method of argument must be considered as
fallacious and sophistical.
The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity
is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not compre-
hended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we
can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shows wisdom and
goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shows a particular degree of these per-
fections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we
examine. But further attributes or further degrees of the same attributes, we can never be
authorized to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, without some such
license of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or infer any alter-
ation in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater
good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more
impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to
justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to
the attributes of the Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by
any reason or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis.*
The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded licence of
conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider ourselves, as in the place of the
Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct,
which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible.
But, besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost everything is
regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; besides, this, I say, it must
evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason, from the intentions and pro-
jects of men, to those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature,
there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when, from
*In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim, that where any cause is known only by its
particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause; since the qualities, which are
requisite to produce these new effects along with the former, must either be different, or superior, or of more
extensive operation, than those which simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed to be
known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that
the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy, which is already known from the first
effects, will not remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which can seldom be supposed),
the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same), I say,
this exertion of a like energy, in a different period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and what
there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects, from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally
derived. Let the inferredcause be exactly proportioned (as it should be) to the known effect; and it is impos-
sible that it can possess any qualities, from which new or different effects can be inferred.