62 PLATO
just is something advantageous, but you’re making an addition and claiming it to be that
of the stronger, while I don’t know that, it needs to be examined.”
“So examine it,” he said.
“That will be done,” I said. “Now tell me, do you not claim, though, that it’s also
just to obey the rulers?”
“I do.”
“And are the rulers in each city infallible, or the sort of people who also make
mistakes?”
“By all means,” he said, “they’re surely the sort of people who also make mistakes.”
“So when they try to set up laws, they set up some correctly and certain others
incorrectly?”
“I certainly imagine so.”
“Then to set them up correctly is to set up laws that are advantageous to them-
selves, and incorrectly, disadvantageous ones? Or how do you mean it?”
“That’s the way.”
“But whatever they set up needs to be done by those who are ruled, and this is
what is just?”
“How could it be otherwise?”
“Then according to your statement, not only is it just to do what’s advantageous
to the stronger, but also to do the opposite, what’s disadvantageous.”
“What do you mean?” he said.
“What you mean, it seems to me; but let’s examine it better. Wasn’t it agreed that
when the rulers command those who are ruled to do certain things they’re sometimes
completely mistaken about what’s best for themselves, but what the rulers command is
just for those who are ruled to do? Wasn’t this agreed?”
“I certainly imagine so,” he said.
“Well then,” I said, “imagine also that it was agreed by you that doing what’s
disadvantageous for those who rule and are stronger is just, whenever the rulers unwill-
ingly command things that are bad for themselves, while you claim that for the others to
do those things which they commanded is just. So then, most wise Thrasymachus, doesn’t
it turn out necessarily in exactly this way, that it’s just to do the opposite of what you
say? For what’s disadvantageous to the stronger is without doubt commanded to the
weaker to do.”
“By Zeus, yes, Socrates,” said Polemarchus, “most clearly so.”
“If you’re going to be a witness for him,” Cleitophon interjected.
“And what need is there for a witness? Thrasymachus himself agrees that the
rulers sometimes command things that are bad for themselves, and that for the others to
do these things is just.”
“That’s because Thrasymachus set it down, Polemarchus, that doing what’s
ordered by the rulers is just.”
“Because he also set it down, Cleitophon, that what’s advantageous to the
stronger is just. And having set down both these things, he agreed next that sometimes
the stronger order things that are disadvantageous to themselves for those who are
weaker and ruled to do. And from these agreements what’s advantageous to the stronger
would be no more just than what’s disadvantageous.”
“But,” said Cleitophon, “he meant that the advantage of the stronger is what the
stronger believes is advantageous to himself; this is what needs to be done by the
weaker, and he set this down as what’s just.”
“But he didn’t say it that way,” said Polemarchus.cde340a
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