68 PLATO
he tried out whether the ring had this power in it, and it turned out that way for him, to
become invisible when he twisted the stone setting in and visible when he twisted it out.
Perceiving this, he immediately arranged to become one of the messengers attending
the king, and went and seduced the king’s wife, and with her attacked and killed the
king and took possession of his reign.
“Now if there were a pair of rings of that sort, and a just person put on one
while an unjust person put on the other, it would seem that there could be no one so
inflexible that he’d stand firm in his justice and have the fortitude to hold back
and not lay a hand on things belonging to others, when he was free to take what he
wanted from the marketplace, and to go into houses and have sex with anyone
he wanted, and to kill and set loose from chains everyone he wanted, and to do
everything he could when he was the equal of a god among human beings. And in
acting this way, he would do nothing different from the other, but both would go the
same route.
“And surely someone could claim this is a great proof that no one is just will-
ingly, but only when forced to be, on the grounds that it is not for his private good,
since wherever each one imagines he’ll be able to do injustice he does injustice.
Because every man assumes that injustice is much more profitable to him privately
than justice, and the one saying the things involved in this sort of argument will
claim that he’s assuming the truth, because if anyone got hold of such freedom and
was never willing to do injustice or lay a hand on things belonging to others, he’d
seem to be utterly miserable to those who observed it, and utterly senseless as well,
though they’d praise him to each other’s faces, lying to one another from fear of suf-
fering injustice.
“So that’s the way that part goes. But as for the choice itself of the life of the peo-
ple we’re talking about, we’ll be able to decide it correctly if we set the most just person
opposite the most unjust; if we don’t, we won’t be able to. What then is the way of
opposing them? This: we’ll take nothing away either from the injustice of the unjust
person or from the justice of the just person, but set out each as complete in his own pur-
suit. First, then, let the unjust one do as clever workmen do; a top helmsman, for
instance, or doctor, distinguishes clearly between what’s impossible in his art and
what’s possible, and attempts the latter while letting the former go, and if he still slips
up in any way, he’s competent to set himself right again. So too, let the unjust person,
attempting his injustices in the correct way, go undetected, if he’s going to be surpass-
ingly unjust. Someone who gets caught must be considered a sorry specimen, since the
ultimate injustice is to seem just when one is not.
“So one must grant the completely unjust person the most complete injustice, and
not take anything away but allow him, while doing the greatest injustices, to secure for
himself the greatest reputation for justice; and if thereafter he slips up in anything, one
must allow him to have the power to set himself right again, and to be competent both
to speak so as to persuade if he’s denounced for any of his injustices, and to use force
for everything that needs force, by means of courage and strength as well as a provision
of friends and wealth. And having set him up as this sort, let’s stand the just person
beside him in our argument, a man simple and well bred, wishing not to seem but be
good, as Aeschylus puts it.
“So one must take away the seeming, for if he’s going to seem to be just
there’ll be honors and presents for him as one seeming that way. Then it would be
unclear whether he would be that way for the sake of what’s just or for the sake of
the presents and honors. So he must be stripped bare of everything except justice andbcde361a
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