Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

844 IMMANUELKANT

state of affairs is quite altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but in

all its parts; otherwise it is nothing at all; because, as speculation of pure reason, it finds

a hold only on common convictions. Beyond its field, however, probability and com-

mon sense may be used justly and with advantage, but on quite special principles, the

importance of which always depends on their reference to practical life.

This is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility of metaphysics

as a science.

APPENDIX

ONWHATCANBEDONE TOMAKEMETAPHYSICS

AS ASCIENCEACTUAL

Since all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal, and since without a

preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be attained, the present attempt

has a right to an accurate and careful examination, unless it be thought more advisable

to give up all pretensions to metaphysics, to which, if men but would consistently

adhere to their purpose, no objection can be made.

If we take the course of things as it is, not as it ought to be, there are two sorts of

judgments: (1) one a judgment which precedes investigation (in our case one in which the

reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgment on the Critique of Pure Reason,

which was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics); (2) the other a judg-

ment subsequent to investigation. In the latter, the reader is enabled to ignore for a while the

consequences of the critical researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted

metaphysics, and first examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived.

If what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain, as is the case with the

theorems of geometry, the former way of judging would hold good. For if the conse-

quences of certain principles are repugnant to established truths, these principles are false

and without further inquiry to be repudiated. But if metaphysics does not possess a stock of

indisputably certain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even be the case that there are

a number of them, which, though among the most plausible, are by their consequences in

mutual conflict, and if no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical (synthetical)

propositions is to be met with in it, then the former way of judging is not admissible, but the

investigation of the principles of the Critiquemust precede all judgments as to its value.

A SPECIMEN OF AJUDGMENT OF THECRITIQUE

PRIOR TOITSEXAMINATION

Such a judgment is to be found in the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen,in the supplement

to the third part, of January 19, 1782, pages 40 et seq.

When an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and endeavors to pre-

sent his independent reflections in its elaboration falls into the hands of a reviewer who, in

his turn, is keen enough to discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the

book rests, who does not cling to words but goes to the heart of the subject, sifting and

testing the principles which the author takes as his point of departure, the severity of the

judgment may indeed displease the author, but the public does not care, as it gains thereby.

And the author himself may be contented, as an opportunity of correcting or explaining

his positions is afforded to him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge,

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