It is, in fact, absolutely impossible by experience to discern with complete certainty
a single case in which the maxim of an action, however much it might conform to duty,
rested solely on moral grounds and on the conception of one’s duty. It sometimes happens
that in the most searching self-examination we can find nothing except the moral ground
of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that good action and
to such great sacrifice. But from this we cannot by any means conclude with certainty that
a secret impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the Idea of duty, was not actually the
true determining cause of the will. For we like to flatter ourselves with a pretended nobler
motive, while in fact even the strictest examination can never lead us entirely behind the
secret incentives, for when moral worth is in question it is not a matter of actions which
one sees but of their inner principles which one does not see.
Moreover, one cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule all morality as a
mere phantom of human imagination overreaching itself through self-conceit than by con-
ceding that the concepts of duty must be derived only from experience (for they are ready,
from indolence, to believe that this is true of all other concepts too). For, by this conces-
sion, a sure triumph is prepared for them. Out of love for humanity I am willing to admit
that most of our actions are in accord with duty; but if we look more closely at our
thoughts and aspirations, we come everywhere upon the dear self, which is always turning
up, and it is this instead of the stern command of duty (which would often require self-
denial) which supports our plans. One need not be an enemy of virtue, but only a cool
observer who does not confuse even the liveliest aspiration for the good with its actuality,
to be sometimes doubtful whether true virtue can really be found anywhere in the world.
This is especially true as one’s years increase and the power of judgment is made wiser by
experience and more acute in observation. This being so, nothing can secure us against the
complete abandonment of our ideas of duty and preserve in us a well-founded respect for
its law except the conviction that, even if there never were actions springing from such
pure sources, our concern is not whether this or that was done, but that reason of itself and
independently of all appearances commanded what ought to be done. Our concern is with
actions of which perhaps the world has never had an example, with actions whose feasi-
bility might be seriously doubted by those who base everything on experience, and yet
with actions inexorably commanded by reason. For example, pure sincerity in friendship
can be demanded of every man, and this demand is not in the least diminished if a sincere
friend has never existed, because this duty, as duty in general, prior to all experience lies
in the Idea of reason which determines the will on a priorigrounds.
No experience, it is clear, can give occasion for inferring the possibility of such
apodictic laws. This is especially clear when we add that, unless we wish to deny all
truth to the concept of morality and renounce its application to any possible object, we
cannot refuse to admit that the law is of such broad significance that it holds not merely
for men but for all rational beings as such; we must grant that it must be valid with
absolute necessity, and not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions. For
with what right could we bring into unlimited respect something that might be valid
only under contingent human conditions? And how could laws of the determination of
our will be held to be laws of the determination of the will of any rational being what-
ever and of ourselves in so far as we are rational beings, if they were merely empirical
and did not have their origin completely a prioriin pure, but practical, reason?
Nor could one given poorer counsel to morality than to attempt to derive it from
examples. For each example of morality which is exhibited must itself have been previ-
ously judged according to principles of morality to see whether it was worthy to serve as
an original example or model. By no means could it authoritatively furnish the concept of862 IMMANUELKANT
408
407