morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospel must be compared with our ideal of moral
perfection before He is recognized as such; even He says of Himself, “Why call ye Me
(Whom you see) good? None is good (the archetype of the good) except God only (Whom
you do not see).” But whence do we have the concept of God as the highest good? Solely
from the Idea of moral perfection which reason formulates a prioriand which it insepara-
bly connects with the concept of a free will. Imitation has no place in moral matters, and
examples serve only for encouragement. That is, they put beyond question the possibility
of performing what the law commands, and they make visible that which the practical rule
expresses more generally. But they can never justify our guiding ourselves by examples
and our setting aside their true original, which lies in reason.
If there is thus no genuine supreme principle of morality which does not rest on
pure reason alone independent of all possible experience, I do not believe it is necessary
even to ask whether it is well to exhibit these concepts generally (in abstracto), which,
together with the principles belonging to them, are established a priori. At any rate, the
question need not be asked if knowledge of them is to be distinguished from ordinary
knowledge and called philosophical. But in our times this question may be necessary.
For if we collected votes as to whether pure rational knowledge separated from all expe-
rience (i.e., a metaphysics of morals) or popular practical philosophy is to be preferred,
it is easily guessed on which side the majority would stand.
This condescension to popular notions is certainly very commendable once the
ascent to the principles of pure reason has been satisfactorily accomplished. That would
mean the prior establishment of the doctrine of morals on metaphysics and then, when it
is established, procuring a hearing for it through popularization. But it is extremely absurd
to want to achieve popular appeal in the first investigation, where everything depends on
the correctness of the fundamental principles. Not only can this procedure never make
claim to that rarest merit of true philosophical popularity, since there is really no art in
being generally comprehensible if one thereby renounces all basic insight; but it produces
a disgusting jumble of patched-up observations and half-reasoned principles. Shallow
pates enjoy this, for it is very useful in everyday chitchat, while the more sensible feel
confused and dissatisfied and avert their eyes without being able to help themselves. But
philosophers, who see through this delusion, get little hearing when they call people away
from this would-be popularity so that they may have genuine popular appeal once they
have gained a definite understanding.
One need only look at the essays on morality favored by popular taste. One will
sometimes meet with the particular vocation of human nature (but occasionally with the
Idea of a rational nature in general), sometimes perfection and sometimes happiness,
here moral feeling, there fear of God, a little of this and a little of that in a marvelous
mixture. It never occurs to the authors, however, to ask whether the principles of moral-
ity are, after all, to be sought anywhere in knowledge of human nature (which we can
derive only from experience). And if this is not the case, if the principles are a priori,free
from everything empirical, and found exclusively in pure rational concepts and not at all
in any other place, they never ask whether they should undertake this investigation as a
separate inquiry (i.e., as pure practical philosophy) or (if one may use a name so decried)
a metaphysics* of morals. They never think of dealing with it alone and bringing it by
FOUNDATIONS OF THEMETAPHYSICS OFMORALS 863
409*If one wishes, the pure philosophy (metaphysics) of morals can be distinguished from the applied
(i.e., applied to human nature), just as pure mathematics and pure logic are distinguished from applied
mathematics and applied logic. By this designation one is immediately reminded that moral principles are
not founded on the peculiarities of human nature but must stand of themselves a priori, and that from such
principles practical rules for every rational nature, and accordingly for man, must be derivable.410