and in every future condition. Now it is impossible for even a most clear-sighted and
most capable but finite being to form here a definite concept of that which he really wills.
If he wills riches, how much anxiety, envy, and intrigues might he not thereby draw upon
his shoulders! If he wills much knowledge and vision, perhaps it might become only an
eye that much sharper to show him as more dreadful the evils which are now hidden from
him and which are yet unavoidable; or it might be to burden his desires—which already
sufficiently engage him—with even more needs! If he wills long life, who guarantees
that it will not be long misery! If he wills at least health, how often has not the discom-
fort of his body restrained him from excesses into which perfect health would have led
him? In short, he is not capable, on any principle and with complete certainty, of ascer-
taining what would make him truly happy; omniscience would be needed for this. He
cannot, therefore, act according to definite principles so as to be happy, but only accord-
ing to empirical counsels (e.g., those of diet, economy, courtesy, restraint, etc.) which are
shown by experience best to promote well-being on the average. Hence the imperatives
of prudence cannot, in the strict sense, command (i.e., present actions objectively as
practically necessary); thus they are to be taken as counsels (consilia) rather than as
commands (praecepta) of reason, and the task of determining infallibly and universally
what action will promote the happiness of a rational being is completely unsolvable.
There can be no imperative which would, in the strict sense, command us to do what
makes for happiness, because happiness is an ideal not of reason but of imagination,
depending only on empirical grounds which one would expect in vain to determine an
action through which the totality of consequences—which in fact is infinite—could be
achieved. Assuming that the means to happiness could be infallibly stated, this impera-
tive of prudence would be an analytically practical proposition for it differs from the
imperative of skill only in that its purpose is given, while in the imperative of skill it is
merely a possible purpose. Since both, however, command the means to that which one
presupposes as a willed purpose, the imperative which commands the willing of the
means to him who wills the end is in both cases analytical. There is, consequently, no
difficulty in seeing the possibility of such an imperative.
To see how the imperative of morality is possible, then, is without doubt the
only question needing an answer. It is not hypothetical, and thus the objectively con-
ceived necessity cannot be supported by any presupposed purpose, as was the case
with the hypothetical imperatives. But it must not be overlooked that it cannot be
shown by any example (i.e., it cannot be empirically shown) that there is such an
imperative. Rather, it is to be suspected that all imperatives which appear to be cate-
gorical are tacitly hypothetical. For instance, when it is said, “Thou shalt not make a
false promise,” we assume that the necessity of this prohibition is not a mere counsel
for the sake of escaping some other evil, so that it would read: “Thou shalt not make
a false promise, lest, if it comes to light, thou ruinest thy credit.” [In so doing] we
assume that an action of this kind must be regarded as in itself bad and that the imper-
ative prohibiting it is categorical, but we cannot show with certainty by any example
that the will is here determined by the law alone without any other incentives,
although it appears to be so. For it is always possible that secretly fear of disgrace,
and perhaps also obscure apprehension of other dangers, may have had an influence
on the will. Who can prove by experience the nonexistence of a cause when experi-
ence shows us only that we do not perceive the cause? In such a case the so-called
moral imperative, which as such appears to be categorical and unconditional, would
be actually only a pragmatic precept which makes us attentive to our own advantage
and teaches us to consider it.
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