Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

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more subjectively than objectively practical, for the difference is intended to bring an
Idea of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thus nearer to
feeling. All maxims have:



  1. A form, which consists in universality, and in this respect the formula of the moral impera-
    tive requires that maxims be chosen as though they should hold as universal laws of nature.

  2. A material (i.e., an end), and in this respect the formula says that the rational being, as by
    its nature an end and thus as an end in itself, must serve in every maxim as the condition
    restricting all merely relative and arbitrary ends.

  3. A complete determination of all maxims by the formula that all maxims which stem
    from autonomous legislation ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with
    a realm of nature.*


There is a progression here like that through the categories of the unity of the
form of the will (its universality), the plurality of material (the objects, ends), to the
all-comprehensiveness or totality of the system of ends. But it is better in moral valua-
tion to follow the rigorous method and to make the universal formula of the categorical
imperative the basis: Act according to the maxim which can at the same time make
itself a universal law. But if one wishes to gain a hearing for the moral law, it is very
useful to bring one and the same action under the three stated principles and thus, so
far as possible, bring it nearer to intuition.
We can now end where we started, with the concept of an unconditionally good
will. That will is absolutely good which cannot be bad, and thus it is a will whose
maxim, when made universal law, can never conflict with itself. Thus this principle is
also its supreme law: Always act according to that maxim whose universality as law you
can at the same time will. This is the only condition under which a will can never come
into conflict with itself, and such an imperative is categorical. Because the validity of
the will as a universal law for possible actions has an analogy with the universal
connection of the existence of things under universal laws, which is the formal element
of nature in general, the categorical imperative can be expressed also as follows: Act on
those maxims which can at the same time have themselves as universal laws of nature as
their object. Such, then, is the formula of an absolutely good will.
Rational nature is distinguished from others in that it proposes an end to itself. This
end would be the material of every good will. Since, however, in the Idea of an absolutely
good will without the limiting condition that this or that end be achieved, we must abstract
from every end to be actually effected (as any particular end would make each will only
relatively good), we must conceive the end here not as one to be brought about, but as a
self-existent end, and thus merely negatively, as that which must never be acted against
and which consequently must never be valued merely as a means but in every volition also
as an end. Now this end can never be other than the subject of all possible ends them-
selves, because this is at the same time the subject of a possible will which is absolutely
good, for the latter cannot without contradiction be made secondary to any other object.
The principle: Act with reference to every rational being (whether yourself or another) so
that in your maxim it is an end in itself, is thus basically identical with the principle: Act
by a maxim which involves its own universal validity for every rational being.


FOUNDATIONS OF THEMETAPHYSICS OFMORALS 879


*Teleology considers nature as a realm of ends; morals regards a possible realm of ends as a realm of
nature. In the former the realm of ends is a theoretical Idea for the explanation of what actually is. In the latter it
is a practical Idea for bringing about that which does not exist but which can become actual through our conduct
and for making it conform with this Idea.


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