That in the use of means to any end I should restrict my maxim to the condition of
its universal validity as a law for every subject is tantamount to saying that the subject
of ends (i.e., the rational being itself) must be made the basis of all maxims of actions
and thus be treated never as a mere means but as the supreme limiting condition in the
use of all means (i.e., as at the same time an end).
It follows incontestably that every rational being must be able to regard himself as
an end in himself with reference to all laws to which he may be subject whatever they
may be, and thus see himself as giving universal laws. For it is just the fitness of his
maxims to universal legislation that indicates that he is an end in himself. It also follows
that his dignity (his prerogative) over all merely natural beings entails that he must take
his maxims from the point of view that regards himself, and hence also every other
rational being, as legislative. Rational beings are, on this account, called persons. In this
way, a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is possible as a realm of ends,
because of the legislation belonging to all persons as members. Consequently every
rational being must act as if by his maxims he were at all times a legislative member of
the universal realm of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is: So act as if your
maxims should serve at the same time as universal law (for all rational beings).
A realm of ends is thus possible only by analogy with a realm of nature. The for-
mer is possible only by maxims (i.e., self-imposed rules), while the latter is possible by
laws of efficient causes of things externally necessitated. Regardless of this difference,
by analogy we call the natural whole a realm of nature so far as it is related to rational
beings as its end; we do so even though the natural whole is looked upon as a machine.
Such a realm of ends would actually be realized through maxims whose rule is pre-
scribed to all rational beings by the categorical imperative, if they were universally
obeyed. But a rational being, though he scrupulously follow this maxim, cannot for that
reason expect every other rational being to be true to it, nor can he expect the realm of
nature and its orderly design to harmonize with him as a fitting member of a realm of
ends which is possible through himself. That is, he cannot count on its favoring his
expectation of happiness. Still the law: Act according to the maxim of a member of a
merely potential realm of ends who gives universal law, remains in full force because it
commands categorically. And just in this lies the paradox that simply the dignity of
humanity as rational nature without any end or advantage to be gained by it, and thus
respect for a mere Idea, should serve as the inflexible precept of the will. [There is the
further paradox that] the sublimity of the maxims and the worthiness of every rational
subject to be a law-giving member in the realm of ends consist precisely in the inde-
pendence of his maxims from all such incentives. Otherwise he would have to be
viewed as subject to only the natural law of his needs. Although the realm of nature as
well as that of ends would be thought of as united under a sovereign, so that the latter
would no longer remain a mere Idea but would receive true reality, the realm of ends
would undoubtedly gain a strong urge in its favor though its intrinsic worth would not
be augmented. Regardless of this, even the one and only absolute legislator would still
have to be conceived as judging the worth of rational beings only by the disinterested
conduct which they prescribe to themselves merely from the Idea. The essence of things
is not changed by their external relations,and without reference to these relations a man
must be judged only by what constitutes his absolute worth, and this is true whoever
his judge may be, even if it be the Supreme Being. Morality is thus the relation of
actions to the autonomy of the will (i.e., to the possible giving of universal law by the
maxims of the will). The action which can be compatible with the autonomy of the will
is permitted; that which does not agree with it is prohibited. The will whose maxims880 IMMANUELKANT
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