are necessarily in harmony with the laws of autonomy is a holy will or an absolutely
good will. The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy
(moral constraint) is obligation. Hence obligation cannot be predicated of a holy will.
The objective necessity of an action from obligation is called duty.
From what has just been said, it can easily be explained how it happens that,
although in the concept of duty we think of subjection to law, we do nevertheless at the
same time ascribe a certain sublimity and dignity to the person who fulfills all his
duties. For though there is no sublimity in him in so far as he is subject to the moral law,
yet he is sublime in so far as he is the giver of the law and subject to it for this reason
only. We have also shown above how neither fear of nor inclination to the law is the
incentive which can give moral worth to action; only respect for it can do so. Our own
will, so far as it would act only under the condition of a universal legislation rendered
possible by its maxims—this will ideally possible for us—is the proper object of
respect, and the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity to give universal laws
under the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation.
The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of MoralityAutonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself indepen-
dent of any property of the objects of its volition. Hence the principle of autonomy is:
Never choose except in such a way that the maxims of the choice are comprehended as
universal law in the same volition. That this practical rule is an imperative, that is, that
the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to it as a condition, cannot be
proved by a mere analysis of the concepts occurring in it, because it is a synthetical
proposition. To prove it, we would have to go beyond the knowledge of objects to a
critical examination of the subject (i.e., to a critique of pure practical reason), for this
synthetical proposition which commands apodictically must be susceptible of being
known a priori. This matter, however, does not belong in the present section. But that
the principle of autonomy, which is now in question, is the sole principle of morals can
be readily shown by mere analysis of the concepts of morality; for by this analysis we
find that its principle must be a categorical imperative and that the imperative com-
mands neither more nor less than this very autonomy.
The Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of All Spurious Principles of MoralityIf the will seeks the law which is to determine it elsewhere than in the fitness of its
maxims to be given as universal law, and if thus it goes outside and seeks the law in the
property of any of its objects, heteronomy always results. For then the will does not give
itself the law, but the object through its relation to the will gives the law to it. This relation,
whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason, admits of only hypothetical
imperatives: I should do something for the reason that I will something else. The moral
(categorical) imperative, on the other hand, says that I should act in this or that way even
though I have not willed anything else. For example, the former says that I should not lie
if I wish to keep my good name. The latter says that I should not lie even though it would
not cause me the least injury. The latter, therefore, must disregard every object to such an
extent that it has absolutely no influence on the will; it must so disregard it that practical
reason (will) may not just minister to any interest not its own but rather show its com-
manding authority as the supreme legislation. Thus, for instance, I should seek to further
the happiness of others, not as though its realization were of consequence to me (because
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