From presupposing this Idea [of freedom] there followed also the consciousness
of a law of action: that the subjective principles of actions (i.e., maxims) must in every
instance be so chosen that they can hold also as objective (i.e., universal) principles, and
can thus serve as principles for our giving universal laws. But why should I, as a ratio-
nal being, and why should all other beings endowed with reason, subject ourselves to
this law? I will admit that no interest impels me to do so, for that would then give no
categorical imperative. But I must nevertheless take an interest in it and see how it
comes about, for this oughtis properly a wouldthat is valid for every rational being
provided reason were practical for it without hindrance [i.e., exclusively determined its
action]. For beings who, like ourselves, are affected by the senses as incentives different
from reason, and who do not always do that which reason by itself alone would have
done, that necessity of action is expressed as only an ought. The subjective necessity is
thus distinguished from the objective.
It therefore seems that we have only presupposed the moral law, the principle of
the autonomy of the will in the Idea of freedom, as if we could not prove its reality and
objective necessity by itself. Even if that were so, we would still have gained something
because we would at least have defined the genuine principle more accurately than had
been done before; but with regard to its validity and the practical necessity of subjection
to it, we would not have advanced a single step, for we could give no satisfactory
answer to anyone who asked us why the universal validity of our maxim as a law had to
be the restricting condition of our action. We could not tell on what is based the worth
which we ascribe to actions of this kind—a worth so great that there can be no higher
interest—nor could we tell how it happens that man believes that it is only through this
that he feels his own personal worth, in contrast to which the worth of a pleasant or
unpleasant state is to be regarded as nothing.
We do find sometimes that we can take an interest in a personal quality which
involves no [personal] interest in any [external] condition, provided only that the
[possession of] this quality makes us fit to participate in the [desired] condition in
case reason were to effect the allotment of this condition. That is, being worthy of
happiness, even without the motive of partaking in happiness, can interest of itself.
But this judgment is in fact only the effect of the importance already ascribed to
moral laws (if by the Idea of freedom we detach ourselves from every empirical inter-
est). But that we ought so to detach ourselves from every empirical interest, to regard
ourselves as free in acting and yet as subject to certain laws, in order to find a worth
wholly in our person which would compensate for the loss of everything which could
make our situation desirable—how this is possible and hence on what grounds the
moral law obligates us still cannot be seen in this way.
We must openly confess that there is a kind of circle here from which it seems that
there is no escape. We assume that we are free in the order of efficient causes so that we
can conceive of ourselves as subject to moral laws in the order of ends. And then we think
of ourselves subject to these laws because we have ascribed freedom of the will to our-
selves. This is circular because freedom and self-legislation of the will are both autonomy
and thus are reciprocal concepts, and for that reason one of them cannot be used to explain
the other and to furnish a ground for it. At most they can be used for the logical purpose of
bringing apparently different conceptions of the same object under a single concept (as we
reduce different fractions of the same value to the lowest common terms).
One recourse, however, remains open to us, namely, to inquire whether we do not
assume a different standpoint when we think of ourselves as causes a prioriefficient
through freedom from that which we occupy when we conceive of ourselves in the light
of our actions as effects which we see before our eyes.886 IMMANUELKANT
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