Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

succeed in this on account of the independence of the thing; the master, however, who
has interposed the servant between the thing and himself, thereby connects himself
only with the nonindependence of the thing, and enjoys it in its purity; the facet of
independence, on the other hand, he leaves to the servant, who works it.
In these two moments the master has his acknowledgement, or recognition, by
another consciousness granted him; for the other consciousness establishes itself in
these moments as something inessential, first, in the working of the thing, second, in the
dependence upon a particular existence; in both it cannot achieve mastery over being
and attain absolute negation. There is therefore present here the following moment of
recognition, that the other consciousness does away with itself as being-foritself, and so
itself does what the other does to it. Likewise the other moment is present, that this
doing of the second consciousness is the first’s own doing for what the servant does is
really the doing of the master; to the latter, solely being-for-himself is the essence; he is
the pure negative power to which the thing is nothing, and hence the pure essential
doing in this situation; while the servant is not a pure doing, but an inessential one. But
for true recognition there is lacking the moment that what the master does to the other
he also does to himself, and what the servant does to himself he also does to the other.
Thus there has arisen a one-sided and unequal recognizing.
The inessential consciousness is here for the master the object which constitutes the
truthof the certainty of oneself. But it is evident that this object does not match its concept,
and that there where the master has fulfilled himself, he has instead had something quite
other than an independent consciousness come to be. It is not such a consciousness that is
for him, but a dependent one rather; he is consequently not certain of being-for-himselfas
the truth, and his truth is rather the inessential consciousness, and the inessential doing of
the latter.
The truthof independent consciousness is accordingly the servile or subject
consciousness.The latter admittedly appears at first outsideitself, and not as the truth of
self-consciousness. But just as masterhood or dominion, showed that its essence is the
converse of what it itself would be, so too, as we shall see, subjection will in its fulfillment
turn rather into the contrary of what it is immediately; it will,qua consciousness driven
backinto itself, go into itself and turn about to true independence.
We have seen only what subjection is in the context of dominion. But the former
is self-consciousness, and accordingly we shall now see what it is in and for itself. First
of all, for subjection the master is the essence; hence the independent consciousness
existing for itselfis to subjection the truth,which however for subjectionis not yet in
subjection.But it has this truth of pure negativity and of being-for-itself in the event in
itself;for subjection has experiencedthis essence within itself. This consciousness was,
namely, not afraid for this or that, or for this instant or that, but for its whole being; for
it has felt the fear of death, the absolute lord, or master. In this fear it has been internally
broken up, it has been thoroughly shaken in itself, and everything fixed has trembled
within it. This pure universal movement, the absolute becoming fluid of all that is per-
manent, is however the simple essence of self-consciousness, absolute negativity,pure
being-for-itself,which is consequently inthis consciousness. This moment of pure
being-for-itself is also for it,for in the master it has it as its object.It is further not
merely this universal dissolution in general,but in serving it actuallybrings it about;
in serving it does away in all particularmoments with its dependency on natural exis-
tence, and works that existence off.
But the feeling of absolute power, in general and in the particulars of service, is
only the dissolution in itself,and although “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of

914 G.W.F. HEGEL