2019-07-01_Discover

(Rick Simeone) #1

JULY/AUGUST 2019. DISCOVER 53


Peeling the Onion


On a normal network, every device — whether it’s a computer running software or a


server storing webpages — attaches an identifying number called an Internet Protocol


(IP) address to data it sends. You can trace this digital identifier to the real world by


linking IP addresses to the location they entered the network — like a cellphone tower


in Peoria, Illinois, or an internet provider’s data center in Portland, Oregon.


The Tor network obscures an IP address by encrypting data as it bounces around


a network, swapping IP addresses along way. When the data reaches its destination,


it will look like it came from a random computer. On the Tor network, every user could


be any other user — everyone is no one.


JULY/AUGUST 2019. DISCOVER 53


Is It Really Anonymous?


Although the Tor network masks your location, there are still ways to reveal


someone’s identity. Here are just a couple:


Traffic analysis: By observing data flows, it’s possible to match exchanges between


linked computers and decipher their true location. For instance, you may notice that


one computer (A) sent a message at a certain time, while another computer (B)


received a message at a time that roughly corresponds to how long it would take


for data to get from A to B. If there are multiple instances of that happening, you


might be on to someone. It’s difficult — you typically need to know the entry and


exit nodes — but it’s possible.


Bitcoin transactions: Researchers in Qatar identified 125 Tor users linked to illegal


services on the network. The team systematically hunted for the addresses of the


digital currency bitcoin. The addresses — unique codes, like credit card numbers —


allow users to send bitcoin to each other. The program scoured both the dark web


and public forums like Twitter. Eventually, the researchers linked publicly posted


bitcoin addresses to the same addresses used in dark web transactions to reveal


users’ identities.


Know Your


Dark Web Lingo


Exit node: The final link in a Tor


circuit. Whether it’s legal or


illegal, every transaction sent


through whatever pathway you’re


using on the network will look


like it came from an exit node.


People who volunteer to operate


exit nodes risk being contacted


by federal law enforcement or


banned by their internet service


providers if illegal data does


pass through their node. Proving


you’re an exit node operator


typically gets you off the hook,


but if you don’t want the hassle,


don’t operate one.


Sniffing: The process of capturing


data packets as they race


through a network. A software


tool, called a sniffer, can monitor


and analyze data for things that


might be incriminating or useful.


For instance, cybersecurity firms


use sniffers to monitor networks


for vulnerabilities.


Fullz: A slang term that describes


full packages of a person’s


information: credit cards, Social


Security, birth date, etc. Fullz can


easily be purchased for $10 to $40


worth of bitcoin from websites


that function just like eBay. Prices


vary depending on the quality


and breadth of the accounts in


the package.


Tumblers: Also known as mixers,


tumblers are web-based services


that ingest potentially identifiable


funds like bitcoin and anonymize


them with a pool of other funds


seeking anonymity. Basically, it’s


digital money laundering.


SecureDrop: A Tor-based


document submission service that


links whistleblowers to journalists.


MEMEX project: A U.S.


government-led initiative aimed


at indexing content across


every layer of the internet,


including data from forums,


Tor services and chats, to make


it more searchable. MEMEX’s


first mission was to help federal


agents discover and disrupt


human trafficking networks


on the internet.


Honeypot: An enticing website


that’s designed to trap users and


steal their identifying information.


A federal agency might use a


honeypot to locate drug dealers


or pedophiles by planting


malware on their computer


when they access the site.


N


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T
W


O
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:^ D


A
N
B


IS


H
O


P
/D


IS


C
O


V
ER


Step 2
Directory
establishes random
path through
network; usually
there are at least
three stops, or
nodes, on path.

Step 4


User sends triple-layer-
encrypted message to A.

Step 5


A unlocks first
encryption layer,
revealing next
address in circuit.

Step 6
Message “hops”
from A to B,
where second
encryption layer
is unlocked,
revealing next
address.

Step 7
Message reaches
C, where third
encryption layer is
unlocked, revealing
final destination.

Step 8
Message, now unencrypted,
reaches destination/server
appearing as if it came from C,
rather than user’s computer.

Node A


Step 3
For a path with three
nodes, the directory
sends three keys —
imagine each key as
two halves of a whole
— to unlock encryption
layers and pass the
message through each
node in a circuit. User
will have one half of all
three keys, while each
node will have only one
half of one key.

Node B


Node C


Step 1
User opens a Tor
browser, establishes
connection with Tor
directory.
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