References 131processor carries out nonsymbolic parallel processing similar
to the neural parallel processing of the brain, and Clark calls
it the brain’s-eye viewof cognition.
Historically, connectionism represents more than simply a
new technical approach to cognitive psychology. From the
time of the ancient Greeks, Western philosophy assumed that
having knowledge is knowing rules and that rational action
consists in the following of rules. Human intuition has been
deprecated as at best following rules unconsciously, and at
worst as based on irrational impulse. Consistent with this
view, psychology has been the search for the rule-governed
springs of human behavior. But connectionism might vindi-
cate human intuition as the secret of human success and re-
habilitate a dissident tradition in philosophy—represented,
for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche—that scorns being
bound by rules as an inferior way of life (Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1986). In addition, psychologists and philosophers are com-
ing to believe that thought guided by emotion is wiser than
pure logic (Damasio, 1994).
In the late 1980s, connectionism and the symbol-system
view of learning and cognition acted as rivals, seemingly
recreating the great theoretical battles of behaviorism’s
Golden Age. However, around 1990 amodus vivendireunified
the field of cognitive science. The two architectures of cogni-
tion were reconciled by regarding the human mind as a hybrid
of the two (Clark, 1989). At the neural level, learning and
cognition must be carried out by connectionist-type pro-
cesses, since the brain is a collection of simple but massively
interconnected units. Yet as we have learned, physically dif-
ferent computational systems may implement the same pro-
grams. Therefore, it is possible that, although the brain is a
massively parallel computer, the human mind in its rational
aspects is a serial processor of representations, especially
when thought is conscious. The more automatic and uncon-
scious (intuitive) aspects of the human mind are connectionist
in nature. Connectionist theories thus have a valuable role
to play in being the vital interface between symbol-system
models of rational, rule-following thought, and intuitive,
nonlinear, nonsymbolic thought.
Cognitive Psychology Today
The computer metaphor of mind dominates the psychologi-
cal study of cognition. There are more computational models
of information processes than can be briefly summarized.
However, four large problems remain outstanding.
- Consciousness. The stubborn fact of consciousness re-
mains, and the computer model of mind has been of lit-
tle help, because computers are not conscious (though
see Dennett, 1991). Why are we conscious? Does con-
sciousness play any causal role in our mental economy
or behavior? Little real progress has been made since be-
haviorist days.- Meaning. How do physical symbols get their meaning;
why does GIFT mean a present in English but poison in
German? Ebbinghaus and S-R behaviorists avoided the
question. Mediational behaviorists said meaning was
carried by covert r-s connections, and Skinner offered an
explanation in terms of tacting. The symbol system hy-
pothesis finesses the issue by saying thinking is governed
by formal logical rules (syntax), not meaning (semantics).
Connectionism, like S-R psychology, tries to dissolve
meanings into nonmeaningful units of response. The prob-
lem has not been solved. - Development. Why and how do children throughout the
world grow up with similar, if not identical, cognitive
processes and a store of common beliefs, despite differ-
ences in environment? - Evolution.Given that the human mind was constructed
by evolution, are there important limits on human cogni-
tion, and certain thoughts it’s easy to think while there
may be others that are difficult or impossible to think?
Space prevents full discussion of these issues, and solving
them lies in the future. See Clark (2001), Leahey (2000,
2001), and Leahey and Harris (2001) for more.REFERENCESAsh, M. G. (1995). Gestalt psychology in German culture: Holism
and the quest for objectivity.Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human memory: A pro-
posed system and its control processes. In K. Spence & J. Spence
(Eds.),The psychology of learning and motivation(Vol. 2,
pp. 89–195). New York: Academic Press.
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and communication.Elmsford,
NY: Pergamon Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Skinner’s Verbal behavior.
Language, 35,26–58.
Clark, A. (1989).Microcognition: Philosophy, cognitive science,
and parallel distributed processing.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: An introduction to the philosophy of
cognitive science.New York: Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the
human brain.New York: Putnam.
Dennett, D. D. (1991). Consciousness explained.Boston: Little,
Brown.