306 Abnormal Psychology
Disorders (DSM),which listed 60 diagnostic categories. In
subsequent editions the categories have been revised and the
number enlarged; the 1968 second edition described 145 men-
tal disorders, the 1977 third edition described 230, and the
fourth 1994 edition described about 450.
Legal Views of the Mentally Ill
The legal system has classified psychopathology based on
different premises. They include the concept of responsibility
for one’s actions and the duty of society to protect those who
cannot protect themselves. The concept of responsibility is
the cornerstone of western law.
Throughout history legislation has been enacted to protect
the insane, as well as to protect society from those who are
disruptive or violent. Western law pertaining to the mentally
ill has its beginnings in the Roman law of Twelve Tables,
codified from traditional practices in the fifth century B.C.,
which provided for the appointment of guardians empowered
with authority over those regarded as incompetent to manage
their affairs. According to Neaman (1975), the Roman laws
of guardianship were designed to protect people and prop-
erty. The insane and the immature could not legally acquire
possessions, nor legally consent and dissent, because they
were presumed to lack the capacity to know what they were
doing. In cases where an insane person had committed a
crime, Roman law held that “an insane person, as well as an
infant, is legally incapable of malicious intent and the power
to insult, and therefore the action for injuries cannot be
brought against them” (p. 90).
Throughout recorded history, laws have been devised to
minimize the social impact of mental disorder. Legal records
dating from the earliest times indicate that throughout Europe
and Great Britain the family and, if family resources were
inadequate or unavailable, the community was responsible
for the care, maintenance, and supervision of incompetent or
deranged individuals. Such persons, if they were harmless to
themselves or others, were kept at home, allowed to roam
and beg, or were maintained by charity extended by members
of the community and the church. Some disruptive mentally
ill individuals may have been driven away by their families
or community—but we have no idea at all of their numbers.
In many places and times, the legal guardians of the insane
were held responsible for their actions and for conserving
their property. Insane persons considered likely to injure
themselves or others could be imprisoned. The antiquity of
such measures is indicated by the fact that mental disorders
were termed “surveillance diseases” in old Icelandic law
(Retterstol, 1975).
Laws that define culpability for criminal actions, as a mat-
ter of whether or not individuals are of sound mind and hence
responsible for their actions, are based on the doctrine of
“free will,” a concept developed by St. Augustine (354–
430 A.D.) and abandoned in scientific psychology. The doc-
trine held that the will is governed by the rational intellect,
which enables the individual to tell right from wrong, to make
judgments, and to choose to act based on rational considera-
tions. Without rational intellect, the individual is not free to
act responsibly. It was assumed that the rational intellect is
not developed in children before the age of seven, fails to
develop in “natural fools,” and is lost in the insane. Therefore,
children, “natural fools,” and the insane are incapable of free
will, and cannot be held responsible for the consequence of
their actions. Although children, natural fools, and madmen
could not be punished for their crimes, it was deemed neces-
sary to supervise and restrain them so they would not pose a
problem to society. The principle of diminished responsibility
was taken into consideration in assessing the guilt of insane
persons for criminal acts and in depriving them of certain
civil rights or obligations. Juries readily pardoned guilty per-
sons they considered demonstrably insane both before and
after the crime. Proofs of insanity most commonly used in
courtrooms were attempted suicide, violent or irrational be-
havior, and abnormal behavior accompanied by sickness.
Neugebauer (1978) reviewed extensive legislation en-
acted in medieval England intended to protect the person,
property, and civil rights of the mentally ill. The laws distin-
guished between persons suffering from congenital subnor-
mality and presumably incurable (“natural fools”) and those,
once normal, who became mentally deranged (non compos
mentis), for whom recovery might be possible. The Preroga-
tive Regis, dating from the thirteenth century, designated the
king as custodian of lands belonging to “natural fools” and
any profit therefrom rendered to the rightful heirs; the lands
of persons considered non compos mentiswere to be con-
served and returned to the persons if they should come to
right mind. Judgment of mental disability relied on common
sense methods such as determining ability to perform simple
intellectual tasks.
In the nineteenth century the concept of responsibility, and
hence culpability in the case of crime, provided the basis for
England’s McNaughten Rules to handle the legal disposition
of criminals judged to be insane. These rules were estab-
lished after the 1843 trial of Daniel McNaughten in London,
which he was found McNaughten not guilty on grounds of
insanity for the murder of Edward Drummond, secretary to
Sir Robert Peel, the British prime minister. The rules hold
that persons who commit crimes while insane are not re-
sponsible for them because they lack the rational faculty