The Brain 49provided evidence that the brain was the center of the ner-
vous system and responsible for sensation, motion, and
thinking (Finger, 1994; Gross, 1987).
In the second era (spanning the second to the eighteenth
centuries), the debate focused on whether cognitive functions
were localized in the ventricular system of the brain or in the
brain matter itself. The influence of the church during this era
cannot be overstated; for example, ethereal spirits (and ideas)
were believed to flow through the empty spaces of the brain’s
ventricles. Nevertheless, by the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies, individuals such as da Vinci and Vesalius were ques-
tioning the validity of ventricular localization. Finally, during
the seventeenth century, partly as a result of the strongly held
views and prolific writings of Thomas Willis, and during the
eighteenth century, with the publication of clinical descrip-
tions of cognitively impaired patients accompanied by crude
descriptions of brain damage (e.g., Baader), the view that in-
tellectual function was localized in brain matter and not in the
ventricles became solidified (Clenending, 1942).
The nineteenth century to the present makes up the third
era, and here debate has focused on how mental activities (or
cognitive processes) are organized in the brain. An early idea,
which became known as the localizationist view, proposed
that specific mental functions were carried out by specific
parts of the brain. An alternative idea, which became known
as the equipotential view, held that large parts of the brain
were equally involved in all mental activity and that there
was no specificity of function within a particular brain area
(Clark & Jacyna, 1987).
Perhaps the most influential idea about localization of
brain function derived from Franz Joseph Gall during the
early nineteenth century. Gall had been influenced somewhat
by the earlier ideas of Albrecht von Haller (Clarke & Jacyna,
1987). In the mid-eighteenth century, Haller had developed a
doctrine of brain equipotentiality, or a type of action com-
mune. He believed that the parts of a distinguishable anatom-
ical component of the brain—the white matter, for instance—
performed as a whole, each area of white matter having
equivalent functional significance (Clarke & Jacyna, 1987).
Indeed, one might characterize Gall’s ideas as a reaction
against the equipotential view of Haller. Gall’s insight was
that, despite its similarity in appearance, brain tissue was not
equipotential but instead was actually made up of many dis-
crete areas that had different and separate functions. Eventu-
ally, Gall was able to characterize 27 different regions, or
organs, of the brain in a scheme that he called organology.
Later, the term phrenologycame to be associated with Gall’s
work. However, this term was coined by Gall’s colleague,
Spurzheim, with whom he had a falling out, and Gall himself
never used the term (Zola-Morgan, 1995).
Gall’s ideas about the localization of cognitive functions
began to tear at the religious and social fabric of the nine-
teenth century. In particular, various governmental and reli-
gious authorities saw his notion that various mental faculties
were represented in different places in the brain as in conflict
with moral and religious views of the unity of the soul and
mind. Gall’s organology, and later versions of phrenology,
faced similar critiques from philosophy and science. Clerics
and metaphysicians were concerned with the larger theologi-
cal implications of the phrenological system. For example, in
Flourens’s critique of phrenology in 1846 (dedicated to
Decartes), Gall and his followers were declared guilty of un-
dermining the unity of the soul, human immortality, free will,
and the very existence of God (Harrington, 1991). Rolando,
the famous Italian neuroanatomist, recognized the elegance
of Gall’s dissection techniques and his tracing of fiber tracts
from the spinal cord to the cerebrum. However, he found no
logical connection between the tracings of the fibers and the
distinct organs in the convolutions of the brain proposed to
house particular mental faculties.
Another scientific criticism had to do with the question-
able way in which Gall had determined the locus and extent
of each of the 27 organs. For example, Gall had localized the
carnivorous instinct and the tendency to murder (organ 5)
above the ear for three reasons: (a) This was the widest part
of the skull in carnivores; (b) a prominence was found there
in a student who was fond of torturing animals; and (c) this
region was well developed in an apothecary who later be-
came an executioner (Barker, 1897).
Another scientific issue critics raised during the nine-
teenth century was that Gall never specified the precise extent
or the anatomical borders of any of the organs. This lack of
rigor, it was argued, made it impossible to correlate a specific
faculty with the size of an organ or cranial capacity (Sewall,
1839). Related criticisms involved Gall’s seeming failure to
acknowledge that there were variations in the thickness of the
skull, that is, variations from one individual specimen to an-
other and from one locus to another within the same skull
(Sewall, 1839).
An oft-cited example of a specific contribution Gall made
to our understanding of brain function is the idea that he an-
ticipated the discovery by Broca in 1861 of a specific speech
area of the brain (Ackernecht & Vallois, 1956; Bouillaud,
1848). However, we believe that a careful reading of the facts
surrounding this discovery tells a somewhat different story.
In fact, Broca never mentioned Gall’s name in his 1861
report. Moreover, he referred to Gall’s doctrine in a rather
negative way. Nevertheless, Broca’s work stands as a clear
example of a modern idea of localization of function built on
the foundation and fundamental idea, established by Gall a