Fallacies 37general rule (moral universal) can be rigidly applied in all cases
that seem to fall under the extension of that rule. Whenever we
take a general rule and apply it to a specific case we can create
the problem of this fallacy. When we argue from the truth of the
general to the supposed truth of the particular, we commit the
fallacy of accident. For example:
Youth is inexperienced.
Joe is a youth.
Therefore, Joe is inexperienced.The major premise is a moral universal— by definition, youth
is inexperienced when compared to older people. The minor
premise is fine. The conclusion is valid. To conclude however,
that Joe is inexperienced in particular activities, or a specific
activity, would not necessarily be true. Joe might be young, but
an exceptionally experienced sailor compared to most older
men.
This fallacy also occurs when one confuses an accidental
predicate with an essential predicate. White, for instance, is
accidental to the essential nature of man; so is religion, nation
ality, or any color. To use any one of these accidental predicates
to comment on the essential nature of any human being is to
commit this fallacy. The concept of accidental predicates and the
relationship to essential predicates extends beyond humans. Any
confusion that arises when one attacks the essential nature of a
thing, because of some accidental quality that in no way dimin
ishes the thing itself, is an example of this fallacy.
SPECIAL CASE This is the opposite of accident. If one
presumes that what is true in one or more special cases is true in
all cases without exception, he commits the fallacy of special
case. Usually any leap from the truth of one or a few particular
instances, to assuming a universal truth without exception,
causes this fallacy. The two most common forms this fallacy
takes in mistaken logic are 1) citing examples of an abuse of a
thing to call for its abolition; or 2) noting the efficacy of a
particular remedy in a few special cases, then claiming that it is
universally effective. Consider one of the great fallacies of the
sixties: “Everyone I know over thirty is untrustworthy, so, never