38 Middle East & Africa The Economist February 20th 2021
Mauritania) on February 16th, he warned
them of “significant changes” to France’s
presence in the region, though he also said
that these would not happen immediately.
For the first time a poll has shown that a
small majority of people in France opposes
the intervention in the Sahel. Mr Macron,
who faces a presidential election next year,
may also have had an eye on anti-France
protests in the region.
Yet governments in the Sahel want
French troops to stay because they have lit-
tle hope of holding back the jihadists with-
out them. Regional forces have improved
markedly, thanks in part to Western train-
ing. In 2019 jihadists attacking a barracks
in Boulikessi in Mali killed at least 40 sol-
diers. Two weeks ago jihadists attacked the
same barracks. This time Malian troops re-
pelled them for the loss of six of their own.
Even so, Mali’s army remains weak. Aly
Tounkara of the Centre for Security and
Strategic Studies in the Sahel, a think-tank
in Bamako, reckons that it could take an-
other ten years before they are ready to re-
place the French. Local forces also have an
appalling human-rights record. Last year
more civilians were killed by security
forces than by jihadists, reckons José Luen-
go-Cabrera of the oecd, a rich-country
think-tank. Such abuses drive angry young
men into the arms of extremist recruiters.
Politicians such as Mali’s interim prime
minister, Moctar Ouane, or Burkina Faso’s
prime minister, Christophe Dabiré, are
pushing for another approach: negotiating
with the enemy. Talks are not on the cards
with the most bloodthirsty outfits, such as
isgs, the group blamed for the slaughter on
January 2nd. But back-channel communi-
cations are already open with jnimthanks
to a prisoner swap last year. In central Mali
three local peace agreements were recently
signed between rival ethnic groups. Few
believe that could have happened without
jihadist involvement.
In Burkina Faso the government has al-
ready negotiated with jnimin some places,
says Héni Nsaibia of Menastream, a con-
sultancy. One example of a deal may be Dji-
bo, a city in northern Burkina Faso. For
months it was blockaded by jihadists.
Then, almost overnight, buses and trucks
began travelling freely.
Ferdaous Bouhlel of the University of
Tours argues that, beneficial as local deals
are, it is only national agreements that can
stem widespread violence. Iyad Ag Ghali,
jnim’s leader, has said he is willing to talk
to the Malian government, but only after
French and unforces have left. Whether
this is a bottom line, or simply a negotiat-
ing ploy, is not clear.
Publicly France says it does not nego-
tiate with terrorists. France’s foreign-intel-
ligence chief, Bernard Émié, recently
called jihadist leaders in the Sahel the “di-
rect heirs to Osama bin Laden”. In private,however, some French officials admit that
their opposition to Sahelian governments
talking with some members of jihadist
groups is not absolute. Even so, agreeing to
talks is far easier than reaching a deal. The
chances of failure are enormous. But after
years of bloodshed many in the Sahel, if
not quite in Paris, are willing to try. SAHNIGERELIVORY
COASTGHANA
IVORY COASTBENINNIGERIAMALIMAURITANIAALGERIABURKINA
FASOD jiboBoulikessi
Zaroumadareye
Bounti Tchoma Bangou^Operation
Barkhane baseTOGOSAHELJihadist violence in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
Jan 2020-Feb 2021, by group involved Deaths
Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin ( JNIM)
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)
Sources: ACLED; French Ministry of Defence 10050250 kmBamakoThe International Criminal CourtThe case against
the prosecutor
B
oris johnson’sgovernment was cock-
a-hoop. The election on February 12th of
Karim Khan, a British barrister, as chief
prosecutor for the International Criminal
Court (icc) in The Hague was surely a sign
that Britain still had diplomatic heft post-
Brexit. Mr Khan’s appointment would be
“pivotal in ensuring we hold those respon-
sible for the most heinous crimes to ac-
count,” beamed Dominic Raab, the foreign
secretary. Others say Mr Khan’s appoint-
ment is less a diplomatic coup for Britain
than for Kenya, whose government has
done much to damage the icc’s credibility.
Victims of human-rights abuses
around the world have been ill-served
since the court began operating in 2002.
Mr Khan’s two predecessors, Luis Moreno
Ocampo and Fatou Bensouda, managed to
secure just five significant convictions be-
tween them in 18 years. Mr Khan has many
of the attributes a successful prosecutor
needs: he is, admirers say, combative, wily
and “frighteningly clever”. He also has dec-
ades of experience in international crimi-
nal law, most recently heading a uninves-
tigation into atrocities committed by Is-lamic State. His candidacy was backed by,
among others, six African ngos.
But he has critics, too. Last month 22
African human-rights groups, most of
them Kenyan, opposed Mr Khan’s candida-
cy. Their concerns stemmed mainly from
his role as chief defence counsel for Wil-
liam Ruto, now Kenya’s deputy president,
in one of the most troubled trials before
the icc. In 2012 the court accused Mr Ruto
and Uhuru Kenyatta, now Kenya’s presi-
dent, of orchestrating ethnic violence in
which more than 1,000 people were killed
after a disputed election five years earlier.
Both cases collapsed. Charges against
Mr Kenyatta were dropped in 2014. The
case against Mr Ruto was halted two years
later, after prosecution witnesses recanted
their testimony or simply vanished. The
iccjudges refused to acquit him, citing
evidence of witness intimidation and “in-
tolerable political meddling”. They also
made it clear that the case could be revived.
There is no suggestion, of course, that
Mr Khan did anything wrong in defending
Mr Ruto. Every defendant is entitled to a
lawyer, and lawyers have a duty to repre-
sent their clients to the best of their ability.
Nor is there any reason to believe that Mr
Khan was anything but appalled that wit-
nesses were intimidated. Judges in the
case praised him for reporting witness-
tampering to the police. Even so, the Ruto
case raises a number of questions.
The first is: what would Mr Khan do if
the Ruto trial were revived? Even assuming
that Mr Khan asks to be recused from all
matters involving the Kenyan deputy pres-
ident, as is routine in such matters, would
a pall still be cast over the court? “It is not
about bias but about the perception of bi-
as,” says one Kenyan lawyer.
In this regard, Mr Khan has not always
helped himself. Critics in Kenya believe
that over the course of Mr Ruto’s trial he
overstepped the boundaries of a legal ad-
vocate. In 2016, after the collapse of the
case, he addressed a celebratory rally called
by the ruling party at which Mr Kenyatta
promised that no Kenyan would ever be
tried before a foreign court again. In a tele-
vision interview Mr Khan criticised the
icc’s prosecution, suggesting it was aimed
at “regime change in Kenya”.
Mr Khan’s conduct of the defence won
him admiration among Kenya’s ruling pol-
iticians. In turn he has them to thank for
his new position. Mr Khan’s two predeces-
sors were both appointed by consensus
among the icc’s members. In the middle of
last year the icc’s selection committee re-
leased a shortlist that did not include Mr
Khan. The Kenyan government objected
and demanded that the selection process
be opened up again. The committee duly
complied, allowing Mr Khan and others a
late tilt at the job.
For Mr Khan’s stint in office to be judgedNAIROBI
The International Criminal Court’s new
chief prosecutor is controversial