44 Europe The Economist February 20th 2021
FranceProtection plates
J
ust overa decade ago, France dropped a
rule that had obliged motorists to change
their car’s number plate each time they
moved house to a new administrative dé-
partement. The point was to ensure, in true
bureaucratic style, that the vehicle’s plate
matched the place of residence. Since
2009, however, car owners have been free
to choose which département code they
display, turning number plates into a test
of sentimental attachment, with unex-
pected results.
The surprising favourite is Corsica, an
island that is home to just 340,000 people.
The 2A that represents one of the island’s
two départements, along with its symbol of
a bandanna-wrapped head, was the most
sought-after plate, relative to the local pop-
ulation, over an eight-year period. Moun-
tain regions were also popular. Paris did
not get into the top ten.
This amour for Corsica, which became
part of France in 1796 after a history of con-
tested independence and conquest, may
simply reflect the strong regional identity
of the island’s diaspora. To display a 2A or
2B plaqueis a badge of pride and belonging.
Perhaps, suggest some, it is also a declara-
tion of love for the “isle of beauty”, as it is
known to French tourists, 2m of whom
flock there in a normal year.
Or could it be that a Corsican number
plate, consciously or not, is regarded as a
form of implicit protection? The island has
a history of violent nationalism, after all.
The Corsican National Liberation Front
waged a decades-long armed campaign for
independence. No mainlander wants to at-tract too much attention there. Two dec-
ades ago Claude Erignac, the préfet, or cen-
tral-government representative, was as-
sassinated. Mob and clan rule on the island
have a broad hold on the French imagina-
tion. Honoré de Balzac’s novel, “La Vendet-
ta”, was about Corsican vengeance and
family honour.
Even non-Corsicans in Paris are known
to drive with Corsican plates. “They are
convinced that their car won’t be damaged,
and that they won’t be bothered on the
roads,” suggests Benoit Ginet, founder of
Eplaque.fr, an e-commerce number-plate
business, which registered a dispropor-
tionate demand for those from the island
in 2020. There may also be a form of super-
stition at work. “Motorists feel stronger
with Corsican plates,” he suggests: “It’s a
mark of serenity.” PARIS
Keep safe, drive CorsicanRussia’s propaganda warSympathy for
the devil
F
irst they ignored him. Then they
smeared his underpants with Novi-
chok, a nerve agent. When he survived
that, they jailed him. And now they are try-
ing to demonise him. After years of refus-
ing to utter his name in public for fear of
making him seem important, the Kremlin
is levelling its most intense propaganda at
Alexei Navalny, Russia’s main opposition
leader. He is the subject of every prime-
time news programme and talk show—and
they are not being polite.
The scale and intensity of this propa-
ganda assault are reminiscent of cam-
paigns waged by Stalin’s henchmen in the
1930s against “enemies of the people” and,
more recently, are comparable to the
Kremlin’s information war against Uk-
raine in 2014. The narrative is tried and
tested. As usual, it consists of two parts.
The first is to portray Mr Navalny as a
Nazi who belittles Russia’s victory in the
second world war. Since most Russians are
proud of this victory, and Mr Putin portrays
the state he rules as the successor of the So-
viet Union that won it, the implied mess-
age is that Mr Navalny is a threat to the Rus-
sian constitutional order itself. What such
attacks lack in truth or logic they make up
for in vehemence. Vladimir Solovyev, a
Kremlin mouthpiece, likens Mr Navalny to
Hitler, while adding that “Hitler was a very
courageous man and did not dodge mili-
tary service like this codpiece Führer.”
To provide more material for its propa-
ganda machine, the Kremlin has mounteda show trial. Mr Navalny is accused of de-
faming a second world war veteran, who
had appeared in a propaganda video last
year, promoting changes to the constitu-
tion that allow Mr Putin to rule Russia be-
yond 2024. The charge hinges on Mr Naval-
ny having said that everyone who took part
in that video was a traitor.
The second part of the Kremlin’s narra-
tive is that Mr Navalny is working for for-
eign intelligence services. According to Mr
Putin’s people, he is part of a Western plot
to destabilise Russia and somehow destroy
its national identity. As evidence, they cite
the presence of foreign ambassadors at his
trial, and his team’s pleas to America and
the euto place sanctions on Mr Putin’s cro-
nies. A demand on February 17th from the
European Court of Human Rights that Mr
Navalny be released immediately will
doubtless serve as grist to that mill.
Mr Navalny, who now faces a large fine
and additional time in prison on top of his
current sentence of nearly three years, has
counter-attacked. He mocked the judge by
asking her to recommend a recipe for pick-
ling cucumbers, since it was pointless to
discuss the law with her.
The Kremlin’s campaign betrays its
nervousness about Mr Navalny. His influ-
ence is growing, as shown by the success of
a video he released about a vast secret pal-
ace that was allegedly built for Mr Putin by
his cronies. In a recent poll by the Levada
Centre, an independent pollster, some 36%
of Russians reported having watched the
film or being familiar with its contents,
and another 30% had heard of it.
Such viewing figures represent a four-
fold increase over Mr Navalny’s previous
YouTube audience and shatter the Krem-
lin’s monopoly on information. Unable to
counter his presence on social media and
the internet effectively, the Kremlin has
deployed its indiscriminate television ar-
tillery. Although television reaches mainly
older people, it sends a strong signal to bu-
reaucrats and state employees across the
vast country.
Gregory Asmolov, an expert on infor-
mation warfare and the internet at King’s
College London, says the purpose of the
mudslinging is to sow hatred and division.
“Television propaganda helps to delegiti-
mise people who support Navalny, and
turns them into outcasts and enemies of
the state and the people,” he says. This in
turn helps to justify further repression.
Yet, perversely, the Kremlin is also
helping to boost Mr Navalny’s movement.
It is acting so outrageously that it is mak-
ing it harder for ordinary citizens to ac-
quiesce. And it is making the opposition’s
supporters angrier, the sort of anger Mr Na-
valny has long sought to stoke. Propaganda
is a powerful tool for prolonging an auto-
crat’s power. But it can also act as an irrita-
nt, driving calls for action against him. MOSCOW
The Kremlin’s propaganda against
Alexei Navalny may be backfiring