bonuses based on sales volume, which—from the perspective of salespressure to complete the deal—means basically the same thing.
When a prospect does show up, the salesman knows the chance of thembuying something from him are only about 20 percent to 30 percent on
that day single digits. He also doesn’t like Internet leads, as he closes only six out of. If he lets them walk out the door, his close ratio can slip into the (^)
100 of them and makes less money in so doing, as the profit margins areusually smaller.
He knows a prospect is almost certainly shopping his deal against others—both locally and, thanks to the Internet, perhaps a thousand miles away.
He’s usually not given enough authority to structure the deal, bid the trade,handle financing or do anything else, other than run back and forth to the
managers in the sales “tower,” while you sit there and get more and moreannoyed. After all that, what he’ll end up making on a deal isn’t really even (^)
in his control. There are a myriad of reasons why things are usually donethis way, but for now, just be glad that it isn’t your existence.
Managers make more, of course—though not often the $200,000-$250,000they did a decade ago. Savvy shoppers have whittled away at gross profits
enough that dealership owners, especially the big national companies thatown lots of franchises, can’t justify that anymore. But the managers are still (^)
the brains of the outfit (if you want to call it that), in that they bid trade-ins,structure the deal, and handle the finance and after sales products. Their
turnover is very high; I can’t think of too many sales managers or generalmanagers I’ve seen last more than five years at mainstream dealerships. (^)
Typically, anytime the ownership of a store changes hands, out go all themanagers. They also work really long hours—60-80 per week is typical.