- This reconstruction deserves some elaboration. Poems and songs are paradigm
cases of subjective expression. But Schelling’s claim is quite general and meant to
include rather ‘objective’ artistic forms of representation like the ancient epos or the
modern novel as well. However, the general claim cannot be maintained without soften-
ing the contrast between literary expression and some forms of philosophical prose
drawn above in footnote 28. - Different versions of contemporary aesthetic cognitivism are presented in C.
Jäger, G. Meggle, eds., Kunst und Erkenntnis, Paderborn, 2005. It is worth noting that,
for the later Schelling, art no longer enjoyed the privilege of being the highest form of
human knowledge. In this respect, his later philosophy is much closer to Hegel’s than
some scholars recognize. - Hegel, Philosophie der Kunst, 44. Translating Vergeistigungas ‘spiritualization’
is problematic, of course. But so are the alternatives. - G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in Hegel: Werke, E. Moldenhauer
and K.M. Michel, eds., Volume 13, 141. The translation is mine. - It is worth noting that Hegel makes use of a historical classification of art
that is very similar to the one that Schelling employed in his Philosophy of Art
(1805). Schelling simply distinguishes between ancient and modern art. Modern art,
for him, starts with Christianity. So Schelling’s period of modern art is identical with
Hegel’s romantic art. That which Schelling calls ancient art, Hegel labels classical
art. - It is rather telling that Nietzsche some sixty years later attacked Richard
Wagner’s idea of opera in a similar way, after long years of adoring Wagner and in com-
plete ignorance of Hegel’s criticism of Kunstreligion. - I.e. in his polemic and partly unjust criticism of romantic irony. Terry Pinkard
sees religious and political motives behind Hegel’s attacks on Schlegel. Cf. T. Pinkard,
Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 286. - I cannot explain here why the different arts form a circle, such that poetry
stands at the beginning and at the end of the arts. For an attempt to make sense of this
idea, see my Formbezug und Weltbezug: Die Deutungsoffenheit der Kunst(Paderborn,
2006), Chapter 5. - Danto sees the Platonic criticism of art in a different light, of course, namely as
a disenfranchisement of art. Cf. Danto, op. cit. - Cf. Hegel, Ästhetik, 142.
- Or, to be still more precise, religion and art are originally one (im Ursprung
eins). That means that artistic activity is an integral aspect of religious life, at least in the
beginning of religious and artistic practice. The autonomy of art is necessarily a histor-
ical latecomer. At least both Schelling and Hegel argue in this vein. I have defended this
claim in my Formbezug und Weltbezug, Chapter 6. - This is Hegel’s own point in the third and final part of his Science of Logic
called “The Subjective Logic.” Hegel points out there that any objective knowledge
(claim) is grounded in subjectivity. See also P. Stekeler-Weithofer, Philosophie des
Selbstbewusstseins, Frankfurt, 2005, Chapter 2.3. - Cf. the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
- Remember that the contrast between Schelling’s theory of art and Hegel’s is a
bit exaggerated here. That Schelling’s philosophy of art, at least as it is presented in his
System of Transcendental Idealism, really is one major target of Hegel’s criticism seems
obvious, however.
208 Notes to Pages 65–69