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stand for anything,” Metrick recalls.
The problem, he says, was that
Saks had come to play second
fiddle in shoppers’ minds to the
brands it sold. Case in point:
Practically the only time Saks and
its square logo were front and
center in advertising was when it
was holding sales events. Other-
wise, Saks was an afterthought,
its logo relegated to the bottom of
a fashion brand’s billboard. Met-
rick’s rallying cry for his troops
has since been to make Saks the
“hero” in customers’ eyes. “The
goal is for people to say, ‘I got
this at Saks,’ or ‘Have you been to
Saks lately?’ ”
That’s no small order, what with
some 85% of any luxury depart-
ment store’s offerings overlap-
ping with those of its rivals. And
brands themselves are opening
more of their own boutiques and
taking control of how their wares
are presented, often without the
discount culture that has per-
vaded department stores for the
past decade.
But luxury brands, particularly
smaller ones, can do only so much
with their own sites and stores
in reaching a wide audience.
Department stores offer high foot
traffic and the ability to provide
brands with highly detailed cus-
tomer data, including which other
brands shoppers like.
Yet the question remains: If
you want to buy a Gucci sweater
that is available at Saks, Neiman,
Nordstrom, a Gucci boutique,
or online at Net-a-Porter—why
choose to buy it at Saks?
That’s why Metrick sees
reinventing the flagship as so
important, with many ideas being
adapted to the 40 other stores in
the fleet.
E-commerce, where Nordstrom
is seen as a best-in-class operator,
is another area of Metrick’s focus.
In 2017, Saks introduced Salesfloor,
where an actual salesperson
working at a store—and not a
chatbot or an overseas call-center
operator—is available online to
assist shoppers. The result: Items
bought via Salesfloor have drasti-
cally lowered return rates.
“She’s thinking about every
other online experience she’s hav-
ing today, and is Saks as easy as
all that?” says HBC CEO Helena
Foulkes of the prototypical Saks
shopper.
Saks was recently reminded
of how hard it is to win over the
modern shopper, even on its home
turf. In January it closed a wom-
en’s store in lower Manhattan after
only two years, a move indicative
of the company’s renewed focus.
“The next dollar I invest has to bein the place with the most upside,”
says Foulkes.
That means doubling down on
its best-performing business—
Saks—particularly, the flagship.
Though HBC doesn’t break out
individual stores’ numbers, the
Manhattan flagship generates at
least $600 million a year, or about
15% of Saks’ total sales.
“The Saks brand is only going to
be as strong as that Fifth Avenue
store,” says Scotiabank retail
analyst Patricia Baker. Still, Saks
doesn’t want its so-called branches
to be seen as backwaters. So edgy
brands like Vetements and Jacque-
mus are now sold at other stores
too, not just in Manhattan.
Another idea that has been
adapted to other branches is The
Collective, an area that focuses on
up-and-coming brands, to solidify
what Metrick calls “Saks’ fashion
authority.”
“Our role in the fashion ecosys-
tem is to be the place to introduce
brands to our consumer,” he says.
Under Metrick and Foulkes, the
company has a much faster me-
tabolism. Fail fast, and move on.
“The luxury consumer is certainly
less forgiving and less patient
than they used to be,” Metrick
says. Making Saks’ elevation of
the retail experience all the more
important.RETAIL
Diners at
L’A v e n u e , a
Philippe Starck–
designed eatery
on the store’s
ninth floor (left).
No more spritz:
The ground
floor is home to
leather goods.