have tried to do in the preceding chapters. An alternative
strategy is to attempt to undermine the plausibility of the
prevailing attitude by revealing its historical origins.
Theattitudestowardanimalsofpreviousgenerationsareno
longer convincing because they draw on
presuppositions—religious, moral, metaphysical—that are
now obsolete. Because we do not defend our attitudes to
animals in the way that Saint
Thomas Aquinas, for example, defended his attitudes to
animals, wemaybereadytoacceptthatAquinas usedthe
religious,moral,andmetaphysicalideasofhistimetomask
thenakedself-interestofhumandealingswithotheranimals.
If we can see that past generations accepted as right and
naturalattitudesthatwerecognizeasideologicalcamouflages
forself-servingpractices—andif,atthesametime,itcannot
bedeniedthatwecontinuetouseanimalstofurtherourown
minorinterestsinviolationoftheirmajorinterests—wemay
be persuaded to take a more skeptical view of those
justifications of our own practicesthat we ourselves have
taken to be right and natural.
Western attitudes to animals have roots in two traditions:
Judaism and Greek antiquity. These roots unite in
Christianity,anditisthroughChristianitythattheycameto
prevailinEurope.Amoreenlightenedviewofourrelations
with animals emerges only gradually, as thinkers beginto
takepositionsthatarerelatively independentofthechurch;
andinfundamentalrespectswestillhavenotbrokenfreeof
theattitudes thatwere unquestioningly accepted in Europe
until theeighteenth century. Wemaydivide our historical
discussion, therefore, into three parts: pre-Christian,
Christian, and the Enlightenment and after.