however, they tried to reconcile their beliefs in human
equalityandanimalinequalitybyargumentsthatareeither
deviousormyopic.Forinstance,onephilosopherprominent
in philosophical discussions of equality at the time was
RichardWasserstrom,thenprofessorofphilosophyandlaw
attheUniversity ofCalifornia,Los Angeles. Inhis article
“Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination,”
Wasserstrom defined “human rights” as those rights that
human beings haveand nonhumans donot have.He then
argued that there are human rights to well-being and to
freedom. In defending theidea of a human right to well-
being,Wasserstrom said that to deny someonerelief from
acutephysicalpainmakesitimpossibleforthatpersontolive
afullorsatisfyinglife.Hethenwenton:“Inarealsense,the
enjoyment of these goods differentiates human from
nonhumanentities.”^32 Theproblemisthatwhenwelookback
tofindtowhattheexpression“thesegoods”refers,theonly
examplegivenisrelieffromacutephysicalpain—something
that nonhumans mayappreciate as well as humans. So if
humanbeingshavearighttorelieffromacutephysicalpain,
it would not be a specifically human right, in the sense
Wasserstrom had defined. Animals would have it too.
Facedwitha situation inwhich theysawaneedforsome
basis for themoral gulf that is still commonly thoughtto
separatehumanbeingsand animals,butunableto findany
concretedifferencebetweenhumanbeingsandanimals that
would do this withoutundermining the equalityof human
beings,philosopherstendedtowaffle.Theyresortedtohigh-
sounding phrases like “the intrinsic dignity of the human
individual.”^33 Theytalkedof“theintrinsicworthofallmen”
(sexismwasaslittlequestionedasspeciesism)asifallmen
(humans?)hadsomeunspecifiedworththatotherbeingsdo