nothave.^34 Ortheywouldsaythathumanbeings,andonly
humanbeings, are“ends in themselves” while“everything
other than a person can only have value for a person.”^35
Aswesawintheprecedingchapter,theideaofadistinctive
humandignityandworthhasalonghistory.Inthepresent
century,untilthe1970s,philosophershadcastofftheoriginal
metaphysicaland religiousshacklesofthisidea,and freely
invoked it
withoutfeelinganyneedtojustifytheideaatall.Whyshould
we not attribute “intrinsicdignity” or “intrinsic worth” to
ourselves?Whyshouldwenotsaythatwearetheonlythings
intheuniversethathaveintrinsicvalue?Ourfellowhuman
beingsareunlikelytorejecttheaccoladeswesogenerously
bestowuponthem,andthosetowhomwedenythehonorare
unabletoobject.Indeed,whenwethinkonlyofhumanbeings
itcanbeveryliberal,veryprogressive,totalkofthedignity
ofallofthem.Insodoingweimplicitlycondemnslavery,
racism,andotherviolationsofhumanrights.Weadmitthat
weourselvesareinsomefundamentalsenseonaparwiththe
poorest,mostignorantmembersofourownspecies.Itisonly
when wethink ofhuman beings asno morethan a small
subgroupofallthebeingsthatinhabitourplanetthatwemay
realizethatinelevatingourownspeciesweareatthesame
time lowering the relative status of all other species.
Thetruthisthattheappealtotheintrinsicdignityofhuman
beingsappearstosolvetheegalitarianphilosopher’sproblems
only aslong asitgoesunchallenged. Oncewe askwhyit
should be that all human beings—including infants, the
intellectually disabled,criminal psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin,
and therest—have some kind of dignityor worth that no
elephant,pig,orchimpanzee caneverachieve,wesee that