course, be perfectlycompatible with the obvious fact that
there
aresome womenwhoareless wellsuitedto lookingafter
children,andbetter suitedtogoing outtowork,thansome
men. Would any philosopher then claim that these
exceptionalwomenshouldbetreatedinaccordancewithwhat
is“normalforthesex”—andtherefore,say,notbeadmitted
tomedicalschool—ratherthaninaccordancewiththeiractual
characteristics?Idonotthinkso.Ifindithardtoseeanything
inthisargumentexceptadefenseofpreferringtheinterestsof
membersofourownspeciesbecausetheyaremembersofour
own species.
Liketheotherphilosophicalargumentscommonbeforethe
idea of equality for animals was taken seriously by
philosophers,this onestandsasawarningoftheeasewith
whichnotonlyordinarypeople,butalsothosemostskilledin
moral reasoning, can fall victim to a prevailing ideology.
Now,however,Iamtrulydelightedtoreportthatphilosophy
has thrown off its ideological blinkers. Many of today’s
universitycoursesinethicsreallydochallengetheirstudents
torethinktheirattitudesonarangeofethicalissues,andthe
moralstatusofnonhumananimalsisprominentamongthem.
Fifteenyearsago Ihadtosearchhardtofind ahandfulof
referencesbyacademicphilosophersontheissueofthestatus
ofanimals;todayIcouldhavefilledthisentirebookwithan
accountofwhathasbeenwrittenonthistopicduringthepast
fifteenyears.Articlesonhowweoughttotreatanimalsare
includedinvirtuallyallthestandardcollectionsofreadings
usedinappliedethicscourses.Itisthecomplacent,unargued
assumptionsofthemoralinsignificanceofnonhumananimals
which have become scarce.