discussion in the circles of academic philosophy. In
consideringthestatusofnonhumananimals,philosophyitself
hasundergonearemarkabletransformation:ithasabandoned
thecomfortableconformismofaccepteddogmaandreturned
to its ancient Socratic role.
Thecoreofthisbookistheclaimthattodiscriminateagainst
beings solely on account of their species is a form of
prejudice, immoraland indefensible in the sameway that
discrimination on the basis of race is immoral and
indefensible.Ihavenotbeencontenttoputforwardthisclaim
asa bareassertion,or asa statement ofmy ownpersonal
view,whichothersmayormaynotchoosetoaccept.Ihave
arguedforit,appealingto reasonratherthantoemotion or
sentiment.Ihavechosenthispath,notbecauseIamunaware
oftheimportanceofkindfeelingsandsentimentsofrespect
towardothercreatures,butbecausereasonismoreuniversal
andmorecompellinginitsappeal.GreatlyasIadmirethose
who have eliminated speciesism from their lives purely
becausetheirsympatheticconcernforothersreachesouttoall
sentientcreatures,Idonotthinkthatanappealtosympathy
andgood-heartednessalonewillconvincemostpeopleofthe
wrongnessofspeciesism.Evenwhereotherhumanbeingsare
concerned, people are surprisingly adept at limiting their
sympathies to those of their own nation or race. Almost
everyone,however,isatleastnominallypreparedtolistento
reason. Admittedly, there are some who flirt with an
excessivesubjectivisminmorality,sayingthatanymoralityis
asgoodasanyother;butwhenthesesamepeoplearepressed
to sayif theythinkthe moralityofHitler, orof theslave
traders,isasgood asthemoralityofAlbertSchweitzer or
Martin Luther King, they find that, after all, they believe
some moralities are better than others.