thatanimalsareincapableofsufferinginanywayatall;that
theyare, in fact,unconscious automata, possessing neither
thoughts nor feelings nor a mental life of any kind.
Although, asweshallsee in alater chapter, theview that
animals are automata was proposed by the seventeenth-
centuryFrenchphilosopherRenéDescartes,tomostpeople,
thenand now,itisobviousthatif,forexample,westicka
sharpknifeintothestomachofan unanesthetized dog,the
dogwillfeelpain.Thatthisissoisassumedbythelawsin
most civilized countries that prohibit wanton cruelty to
animals. Readers whose common sense tells them that
animals dosuffermaypreferto skiptheremainderofthis
section,moving straighton topage 15,sincethepages in
betweendonothingbutrefuteapositionthattheydonothold.
Implausibleasitis,though,forthesakeofcompletenessthis
skeptical position must be discussed.
Doanimalsotherthanhumansfeelpain?Howdoweknow?
Well,howdoweknowifanyone,humanornonhuman,feels
pain?Weknowthatweourselvescanfeelpain.Weknowthis
from thedirectexperience ofpainthat wehavewhen, for
instance, somebody presses a lighted cigarette against the
backofourhand.Buthowdoweknowthatanyoneelsefeels
pain? We cannot directly experience anyone else’s pain,
whetherthat“anyone”isourbestfriendorastraydog.Painis
astateofconsciousness,a“mentalevent,”andassuchitcan
never be observed. Behavior like writhing, screaming, or
drawing one’shand away from thelighted cigarette isnot
painitself;noraretherecordingsaneurologistmightmakeof
activitywithinthebrainobservationsofpainitself.Pain is
somethingthatwefeel,andwecanonlyinferthatothersare
feeling it from various external indications.