Thewrongnessofkillingabeingismorecomplicated.Ihave
kept,andshallcontinuetokeep,thequestionofkillinginthe
backgroundbecause in thepresentstate of humantyranny
overotherspeciesthemoresimple,straightforwardprinciple
ofequalconsiderationofpainorpleasureisasufficientbasis
foridentifyingandprotestingagainstallthemajorabusesof
animals that human beings practice. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to say something about killing.
Justasmosthumanbeingsarespeciesistsintheirreadinessto
causepaintoanimalswhentheywouldnot causeasimilar
paintohumansforthesamereason,somosthumanbeings
arespeciesistsin theirreadinessto killotheranimals when
theywouldnotkillhumanbeings.Weneedtoproceedmore
cautiously here, however, because people hold widely
differingviewsaboutwhenitislegitimatetokillhumans,as
thecontinuing debates over abortion and euthanasiaattest.
Norhavemoralphilosophersbeenabletoagreeonexactly
whatitisthatmakesitwrongtokillhumanbeings,andunder
what circumstances killing a human being may be justifiable.
Letusconsiderfirsttheviewthatitisalwayswrongtotake
aninnocenthumanlife.Wemaycallthisthe“sanctityoflife”
view. People who take this view oppose abortion and
euthanasia. They
do not usually, however, oppose the killing of nonhuman
animals—soperhapsitwouldbemoreaccurateto describe
thisviewasthe“sanctityofhumanlife”view.Thebeliefthat
humanlife,andonly humanlife,issacrosanctisaform of
speciesism. To see this, consider the following example.
Assumethat,assometimeshappens,aninfanthasbeenborn
withmassiveandirreparablebraindamage.Thedamageisso