Several of the practices of industry and governments during the mid-1990s promoted
suspicion. The results of field trials of GE crops were often difficult to obtain—and still
are—creating an atmosphere of distrust. These same groups often argued that genetic engin-
eering of crops was an extension of bread- and winemaking in an attempt to make the unfa-
miliar familiar. John Durant has noted that attempts to characterize biotechnology as merely
trivial extensions of the familiar techniques of baking, viniculture, and breeding are
“pedantic” at best: “The technologies employed are completely different and it is the
power and precision of the new molecular biology that drives both industrial growth and
public concern” (Durant 1992). Comparisons to traditional breeding tend to magnify
rather than soothe consumer concerns.
Many individuals supportive of genetically engineered crops argued that the term
“genetic engineering” was alarming to the public, and instead terms like “crop improve-
ment” and “biotechnology” should be used. Activists responded with “Frankenfood” and
“GMO” (genetically modified organism), which now dominate public discourse. The
topic of genetically engineered food was endlessly surveyed around the world, with
public notions of agricultural biotechnology consistently articulated as concerns about
uncertainty, “playing God,”and the involvement of powerful interests.
15.3 Responses to Fear
In response to public risk controversies—like agricultural biotechnology—many poli-
ticians, company executives, and academics urge citizens to become better educated in
matters scientific, to therefore overcome public fear as a barrier to “progress.” This rhetori-
cal strategy has been advocated by technology promoters in discussions of technological
risk for the past 200 years. More recently, promoters of agricultural chemicals in the
1960s and nuclear energy in the 1970s have embraced the public education model. It has
failed. Today, the notion of public education is the basis of dozens of communications strat-
egies forwarded by government, industry, and scientific societies, in the absence of any data
suggesting that such educational efforts are successful. As noted by Kelley (1995), voters in
democracies routinely make decisions about policies about which they have no detailed aca-
demic understanding. Consumers have and will continue to make decisions about geneti-
cally engineered foods, whether they are “better educated” or not.
Genetic engineering is a powerful technology—and that is the source of potential benefit
and unrestrained angst. It is also why the technology is regulated. As Norman Ball of the
University of Waterloo noted (Ball 1992), all revolutionary technologies create three public
responses, in succession: unrealistic expectations (all new technologies are oversold; there
is an old saying that “bullshit is the grease on the skids of innovation”), confusion, and
eventually finding a way to cope. Biotechnology has been, and continues to be, oversold,
but as with other new technologies, a public discussion over time shifts from one of risks
versus benefits to a more realistic approach of extracting whatever benefits a technology can
bring while actively and prudently minimizing risks. But in many areas of the world, par-
ticularly Europe, the initial formulations of the public discussion of genetically engineered
foods remains, and the products are thoroughly stigmatized, as in France, where risks such
as nuclear energy are embraced (risk perception research would suggest a rejection of
nuclear energy).
This suggests that the varying degrees of public controversy in various countries and
within social groups within countries is directed by repetitious conversations about risks
15.3. RESPONSES TO FEAR 347