violence, another to repressed aggressiveness, but most implicated the
“depersonalization” of urban life with its “megalopolitan societies”
and its “alienation of the individual from the group.” Even Rosenthal,
the newsman who first broke the story and who ulti-mately made it
the subject of a book, subscribed to the city-caused apathy theory.
Nobody can say why the thirty-eight did not lift the phone while
Miss Genovese was being attacked, since they cannot say them-
selves. It can be assumed, however, that their apathy was indeed
one of the big-city variety. It is almost a matter of psychological
survival, if one is surrounded and pressed by millions of people,
to prevent them from constantly impinging on you, and the only
way to do this is to ignore them as often as possible. Indifference
to one’s neighbor and his troubles is a conditioned reflex in life in
New York as it is in other big cities.^7
As the Genovese story grew—aside from Rosenthal’s book, it became
the focus of numerous newspaper and magazine pieces, several televi-
sion-news documentaries, and an off-Broadway play—it attracted the
professional attention of a pair of New York-based psychology profess-
ors, Bibb Latané and John Darley. They examined the reports of the
Genovese incident and, on the basis of their knowledge of social psy-
chology, hit on what had seemed the most unlikely explanation of all—it
was that thirty-eight witnesses were present. Previous accounts of the
story had invariably emphasized that no action was taken, even though
thirty-eight individuals had looked on. Latané and Darley suggested
that no one had helped precisely because there were so many observers.
The psychologists speculated that, for at least two reasons, a bystander
to an emergency would be unlikely to help when there were a number
of other bystanders present. The first reason is fairly straightforward.
With several potential helpers around, the personal responsibility of
each individual is reduced: “Perhaps someone else will give or call for
aid, perhaps someone else already has.” So with everyone thinking that
someone else will help or has helped, no one does.
The second reason is the more psychologically intriguing one; it is
founded on the principle of social proof and involves the pluralistic
ignorance effect. Very often an emergency is not obviously an emer-
gency. Is the man lying in the alley a heart-attack victim or a drunk
sleeping one off? Are the sharp sounds from the street gunshots or truck
backfires? Is the commotion next door an assault requiring the police
or an especially loud marital spat where intervention would be inappro-
priate and unwelcome? What is going on? In times of such uncertainty,
the natural tendency is to look around at the actions of others for clues.
Robert B. Cialdini Ph.D / 101