158 thE sudan handbookexecutive presidency. Presented as a necessary reform to bring decisive-
ness to government, this was to provide Nimeiri with the means to
establish what by the end of the decade was a classic example of increas-
ingly despotic personal rule.
At the same time the populace were supposed to be empowered by
the replacement of multi-party politics with a single party system, the
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). This was conceived as a pyramidal system
with power flowing up from below, but it soon became clear that the SSU
was a control mechanism in which Nimeiri loyalists and cheer-leaders
predominated handing out presidential patronage, as in so many other
single party systems.
The hopes of building stability through patronage were linked to what
appeared to be new economic possibilities. One of these was in the area
of agriculture, especially as the Gulf states, newly enriched by dramatic
increases in oil revenues, provided loans for new investments in food
production, amid talk of Sudan becoming the ‘breadbasket’ of the Arab
world. Agricultural production did expand, but not as much as antici-
pated, while Sudan became heavily indebted in the process. The discovery
of significant reserves of oil led to new hope that this debt could be
managed. An American company, Chevron, began investing and seemed
close to production. However the oil reserves were predominantly in the
south, and Nimeiri began to interfere in the region’s politics to try and
ensure that his government would be the major beneficiary.
As Nimeiri attempted to break the mould of Sudanese politics, those
he had ousted in turn sought his overthrow. The old parties and the new
ideological movements tried repeatedly to bring him down, especially
the Umma Party and the increasingly influential Muslim Brothers. In
1976 Umma supporters who had received arms and training from Libya
infiltrated the capital, aiming to capture Nimeiri at the airport on his
return from abroad. Nimeiri had another narrow escape as another
battle raged for the capture of the capital. But unlike his 1971 escape, he
decided this time that his opponents in northern Sudan could not be so
easily repressed, and in the following year he announced a programmeThe Sudan Handbook, edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok. © 2011 Rift Valley Institute and contributors of National Reconciliation, and made peace with both Sadiq al-Mahdi,
(www.riftvalley.net).