McMillian case. Leading up to the hearing, Michael and I had been followed several times
while doing investigative work in Monroe County. A scary man had called me late one night
to tell me that someone had offered him a lot of money to kill me, but he said he wasn’t going
to do it because he respected what we did. I expressed my appreciation for his support and
politely thanked him. It was hard to know how seriously to take any of it, but it was
definitely unnerving.
After we cleared the building, the police went through the office with dogs. No bomb was
found, and when the building didn’t blow up after an hour and a half, we all filed back
inside. We had work to do.
A few days later, I received a different kind of bombshell, this time a call from the clerk’s
office in Baldwin County. The clerk was calling to let me know that Judge Norton had ruled
in the McMillian case—she needed my fax number to send me a copy of the ruling. I gave it
to her and sat nervously by the fax machine. When only three sheets of paper came through
the machine I was concerned.
The pages contained a tersely worded order from Judge Norton denying us relief. I was
more disappointed than devastated. I had suspected that this would be Judge Norton’s
response. For all his interest at the hearing, he had never seemed particularly engaged over
the basic question of whether Walter was guilty or innocent. He was locked into a
maintenance role: He was a custodian for the system who was unlikely to overturn the
previous judgment, even if there was compelling evidence of innocence.
What was surprising, however, was how superficial, insubstantial, and uninterested the
court’s two-and-a-half-page order read. The judge addressed only the testimony of Ralph
Myers and none of the legal claims we’d presented or any of the testimonies of the other
dozen-plus witnesses. In fact, there was no case law cited in the entire order:
Ralph Meyers took the stand before this Court, swore to tell the truth and proceeded to recant most, if not all, of the
relevant portions of his testimony at trial. Clearly, Ralph Meyers has either perjured himself at trial or has perjured
himself in front of this Court.
The following areas of concern were considered in reaching this decision: The demeanor of the witness; the
opportunity of the witness to have knowledge of the facts which he testified to at trial; the rationale, as stated by the
witness for his testimony at the first trial; the rationale, as stated by the defendant, for his recantation; the evidence of
external pressures brought to bear on the witness prior to and after both trial and recantation; the actions of the witness
that lend credence to his trial testimony and the actions of the witness that lend credence to his recantation; evidence
adduced at trial in contradiction of the witness’ testimony on details, and due to the nature of this case, any evidence
from any source concerning the inability of the witness to have known the facts to which he testified to at trial.
Since the trial of this matter was conducted before the Honorable R. E. L. Key, Circuit Judge, Retired, this court did
not have the opportunity to compare the demeanor of the witness during trial testimony and his recantation testimony.
A review of the other factors set out above does not provide conclusive evidence that the witness, Ralph Meyers,
perjured himself at the original trial. There is ample evidence that pressure has been brought to bear on Ralph Meyers
since his trial testimony which could tend to discredit his recantation. There is absolutely no evidence in the trial record
or the recantation testimony that places Ralph Meyers somewhere other than the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.
This cause having been remanded to the Court for a determination of whether there is evidence to support the theory