THE REAL ERROR OF CYRIL BURTWifhg as a quantified, fundamental particle, psychology could
take its rightful place among the real sciences. "In these princi-
ples," he wrote in 1923 (p. 355), "we must venture to hope that the
so long missing genuinely scientific foundation for psychology has
at last been supplied, so that it can henceforward take its due place
along with the other solidly founded sciences, even physics itself."
Spearman called his work "a Copernican revolution in point of
view" (1927, p. 411) and rejoiced that "this Cinderella among the
sciences has made a bold bid for the level of triumphant physics
itself" (1937, p. 21).Spearman's g and the theoretical justification of IQ
Spearman, the theorist, the searcher for unity by reduction to
underlying causes, often spoke in most unflattering terms about
the stated intentions of IQ testers. He referred to IQ (1931) as "the
mere average of sub-tests picked up and put together without
rhyme or reason." He decried the dignification of this "gallimauf-
ry of tests" with the name intelligence. In fact, though he had
described hisg as general intelligence in 1904, he later abandoned
the word intelligence because endless arguments and inconsistent
procedures of mental testers had plunged it into irremediable
ambiguity (1927, p. 412; 1950, p. 67).
Yet it would be incorrect—indeed it would be precisely contrary
to Spearman's view—to regard him as an opponent of IQ testing.
He had contempt for the atheoretical empiricism of the testers,
their tendency to construct tests by throwing apparently unrelated
items together and then offering no justification for such a curious
procedure beyond the claim that it yielded good results. Yet he did
not deny that the Binet tests worked, and he rejoiced in the resus-
citation of the subject thus produced: "By this one great investiga-
tion [the Binet scale] the whole scene was transformed. The
recently despised tests were now introduced into every country
with enthusiasm. And everywhere their practical application was
brilliantly successful" (1914, p. 312).
What galled Spearman was his conviction that IQ testers were
doing the right thing in amalgamating an array of disparate items
into a single scale, but that they refused to recognize the theory
behind such a procedure and continued to regard their work as
rough-and-ready empiricism.
Spearman argued passionately that the justification for Binet