THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
wielded it as such an effective political tool. The combination of
hereditarian bias with a reification of intelligence as a single, meas-
urable entity defined Burt's unyielding position.
I have discussed the roots of the second component: intelli-
gence as a reified factor. But where did the first component—rigid
hereditarianism—arise in Burt's view of life? It did not flow logi-
cally from factor analysis itself, for it cannot (see pp. 280-282). I
will not attempt to answer this question by referring either to Burt's
psyche or his times (though Hearnshaw, 1979, has made some sug-
gestions). But I will demonstrate that Burt's hereditarian argument
had no foundation in his empirical work (either honest or fraudu-
lent), and that it represented an a priori bias imposed upon the
studies that supposedly proved it. It also acted, through Burt's zeal-
ous pursuit of bis idee fixe, as a distorter of judgment and finally
as an incitement to fraud.*
BURT'S INITIAL "PROOF" OF INNATENESS
Throughout his long career, Burt continually cited his first
paper of 1909 as a proof that intelligence is innate. Yet the study
falters both on a flaw of logic (circular reasoning) and on the
remarkably scant and superficial character of the data themselves.
This publication proves only one thing about intelligence—that
Burt began his study with an a priori conviction of its innateness,
and reasoned back in a vicious circle to his initial belief. The "evi-
dence"—what there was of it—served only as selective window
dressing.
At the outset of his 1909 paper, Burt set three goals for himself.
The first two reflect the influence of Spearman's pioneering work
in factor analysis ("can general intelligence be detected and mea-
sured"; "can its nature be isolated and its meaning analyzed"). The
third represents Burt's peculiar concern: "Is its development pre-
dominantly determined by environmental influence and individual
acquisition, or is it rather dependent upon the inheritance of a
racial character or family trait" (1909, p. 96).
Not only does Burt proclaim this third question "in many ways
- Of Burt's belief in the innateness of intelligence, Hearnshaw writes (1979, p. 49):
"It was for him almost an article of faith, which he was prepared to defend against
all opposition, rather than a tentative hypothesis to be refuted, if possible, by empir-
ical tests. It is hard not to feel that almost from the first Burt showed an excessive
assurance in the finality and correctness of his conclusions."
