36 THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
ligence as a unitary, rankable, genetically based, and minimally al-
terable thing in the head. The Mismeasure of Man is a logical,
empirical, and historical argument against this very theory of intelli-
gence. Of course I could not know the specifics of what the future
would bring. But just as Darwinism can provide as good an argu-
ment against future episodes of creationism as against the antievolu-
tionists of Darwin's own day, I trust that a cogent refutation of a
bankrupt theory will hold, with all its merit intact, if someone tries
to float a dead issue with no new support at some future moment.
Time, by itself, holds no alchemy to improve a case. If good argu-
ments cannot transcend time, then we might as well throw out our li-
braries.
Reasons, history and revision ofThe Mismeasure of Man
i. Reasons
My original reasons for writing The Mismeasure of Man mixed the
personal with the professional. I confess, first of all, to strong feel-
ings on this particular issue. I grew up in a family with a tradition of
participation in campaigns for social justice, and I was active, as a
student, in the civil rights movement at a time of great excitement
and success in the early 1960s.
Scholars are often wary of citing such commitments, for, in the
stereotype, an ice-cold impartiality acts as the sine qua non of proper
and dispassionate objectivity. I regard this argument as one of the
most fallacious, even harmful, claims commonly made in my profes-
sion. Impartiality (even if desirable) is unattainable by human beings
with inevitable backgrounds, needs, beliefs, and desires. It is dan-
gerous for a scholar even to imagine that he might attain complete
neutrality, for then one stops being vigilant about personal prefer-
ences and their influences—and then one truly falls victim to the
dictates of prejudice.
Objectivity must be operationally defined as fair treatment of
data, not absence of preference. Moreover, one needs to under-
stand and acknowledge inevitable preferences in order to know
their influence—so that fair treatment of data and arguments can
be attained! No conceit could be worse than a belief in one's own
intrinsic objectivity, no prescription more suited to the exposure of
fools. (Phony psychics like Uri Geller have had particular success