142 Poverty and Hunger
of judgement for the strong pull of the psychological attractions of such schemes,
and should be able to see clearly the risks they entail and the benefits that might
accrue from alternative uses of the resources involved. Exceptional restraint and
imagination are needed among politicians and civil servants if the lure of the big
scheme is to be neutralized so that a balanced and realistic assessment can be made.
Perhaps it is fortunate that so many African politicians and civil servants possess
and farm their own land. While this may be a distraction it may also satisfy desires
for property and territory, so that they are less prone than their expatriate predeces-
sors to seek such satisfaction through their work. It may in the long term enable
them to take more balanced views of policy and to appreciate more fully the alter-
natives that exist. Certainly it is important to recognize that the choices are neither
clearcut nor easy. It is not enough, as was done in Kenya before independence
(Government of Kenya, 1962, p1), to quote Gulliver’s report of the views of the
King of Brobdignag:
And he gave it for his opinion, that whoever could make two ears of corn or two blades
of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve bet-
ter of mankind, and do more essential service to his country than the whole race of
politicians put together (Swift, 1726, Chapter 7).For the issues are less simple: they include whether, with the same resources, many
more ears of corn, or many more blades of grass, might not be grown in other ways
or in other places; and whether those politicians and civil servants who make major
policy decisions have the freedom, the insight and the courage to choose those
other ways or places, however unspectacular they may be.
Learning from project pathology: The case of Perkerra^10
Introduction (2004)
The Perkerra Irrigation Scheme in Kenya was launched precipitously in 1952 dur-
ing the Mau Mau Emergency. It was known that there had been a proposal for
irrigation on the Perkerra river, but the 1936 exploratory report could not be
found. Detainees were placed in camps on the site and employed on road building
and preparing works and fields for irrigation. From the start, capital and recurrent
costs were high and revenue negligible. Tenants were settled but many left. Areas
irrigated consistently fell far short of those targeted. Agricultural and marketing
problems were intractable. In 1959 with just over 100 settler families, it was
decided to close the scheme down. The decision was then reversed and changed to
running on a care and maintenance basis for three years. By 1962 closure had
become more difficult. The scheme was instead expanded to try to make it less of
a recurrent burden on government. By 1967, with over 500 settler families, com-
mitment had become even harder to reverse, and the scheme continued, with
cross-subsidies from an economically successful sister scheme in another Province,
the Mwea Irrigation Settlement.