The first of the belligerents to organise their
production and manpower, however, were the
Germans. The British naval blockade reducing
essential supplies from overseas – though war
materials continued to pass through neutral
Scandinavian and Dutch ports – made careful
planning all the more essential. Substitute
(Ersatz) materials were invented with scientific
skill and ingenuity. As the general staff, with an
almost characteristic lack of prudence, had made
no plans for a long-drawn-out war, the war the
Germans had to fight, it was a ‘civilian’, Walter
Rathenau, in August 1914, who was responsible
for setting up a centralised organisation to ensure
the supply of essential raw materials.
In Germany, too, the political parties closed
ranks to support the nation at war. Only a small
minority of socialists continued to oppose the war.
The kaiser responded emotionally, declaring that:
‘I do not know parties any more, only Germans.’
He actually received the Social Democratic leaders
in his palace and they were happy to shake hands
with their kaiser. Who would have believed a year
earlier such a thing would happen? Until 1916 the
Burgfrieden(literally ‘Courtpeace’, another typi-
cally Wagnerian phrase) held, but then tensions
began to appear and a larger group of socialists
began to oppose the war. The Reichstag, unfet-
tered, debated war aims and the conduct of gov-
ernment, culminating in the famous peace
resolution of July 1917: ‘The Reichstag strives for
a peace of understanding and lasting reconcilia-
tion of nations. Such a peace is not in keeping
with forcible annexations of territory... .’ But
it turned out that, if German armies were to
prove victorious, the Reichstag did not expect
its resolution to be taken too literally.
In any case, the chancellor was dependent
not on the Reichstag but increasingly on the
high command. The kaiser, too, became more
and more of a shadow. After Hindenburg and
Ludendorff had been appointed to the high com-
mand, they demanded in 1917 the dismissal of
the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. He was too
independent. His successors were nonentities and
Germany practically fell under a Hindenburg–
Ludendorff military dictatorship during the last
year and a half of the war.
If Austria-Hungary had been on the verge of
dissolution through the disaffection of the
Habsburgs’ Slav subjects this would certainly have
shown itself when the Monarchy’s Slav neigh-
bours – the Russians and Serbs – went to war. In
Vienna and Budapest there was much concern.
The Serb, Ruthene and Czech populations were
lukewarm in their war effort. Some Czechs and
Poles formed their own Legions, which fought
for the Allies. But there were no large-scale
defections, let alone national uprisings. Croats,
Slovenes, Italians, Romanians fought bravely side
by side with Germans, Austrians and Magyars,
and so did many Poles and Czechs.
The Austro-Hungarian army was a unique
multinational force. But in one respect it was not
unique: the incompetence of its leadership. The
ordinary soldiers suffered appalling hardships, and
casualties during the first nine months of the war
exceeded 2 million. Even so, new conscripts
allowed fresh armies to be formed. In 1915,
facing war on three fronts with Russia, Romania
and Italy, the Monarchy was too weak to meet all
its enemies, and substantial German armies were
needed to sustain the ally. The ‘national’ division
between Austria and Hungary also impeded the
war effort. The Hungarians refused to go short of
grain and profited by raising prices to the Austrian
half of the Monarchy, which went hungry. War
production, concentrated in Bohemia, was ineffi-
cient. But the multinational army fought on
doggedly, though new recruits failed to maintain
its strength, sapped by the losses in the field. In
1916 the aged Emperor Franz Josef died. His
successor, Charles, believed the Monarchy was
close to collapse, having overtaxed its strength,
and he was soon secretly trying to make peace.
The army remained loyal to the dynasty virtually
to the end.New weapons killed in new ways: attacks from
Zeppelins from the air and poison gas on land.
Far more serious in its effect of spreading war to
non-combatants was the conflict on the oceans.
In 1915 Germany attempted to break the effects
of the British-imposed blockade by ordering its
submarines to sink all belligerent and neutral
ships which entered a ‘war zone’ around the