successful in this respect, persuading the Turks to
attack Russia and enter the war in October 1914.
The Turkish decision not only widened the area of
conflict but also profoundly changed the history
of the Middle East. The future of the Middle East
became a bargaining counter between the powers
at war. Britain invaded Mesopotamia to secure the
oilfields, and supported an Arab revolt. Less suc-
cessful was a British and French naval attack on
the Dardanelles repelled by the Turks in February
and March 1915. However, an attack on Turkey
was still seen by Churchill and Lloyd George as
the best way of striking a decisive blow in a war
deadlocked in the west but immensely costly in
human life. In April 1915 British and French
troops landed on the Gallipoli peninsula with the
object of capturing Constantinople. But the Turks
defended resolutely, and the Anglo-French cam-
paign was a failure. Turkish and Allied losses were
heavy before the Allies finally decided on evacua-
tion, which they completed in January 1916. The
Ottoman Empire did not play a decisive role in the
war: the Turkish participation on the losing side
resulted in its dismemberment and the dramatic
growth of Arab nationalism.
Ottoman territory was held out as bait during
the war in order to keep one ally, Russia,
involved. In the famous ‘secret treaties’, Britain
and France in 1915 promised Constantinople and
the Straits to Russia. Other portions of the empire
were promised to Italy as colonies by the Treaty
of London (April 1915) to induce the Italians to
join the Allies and attack Austria-Hungary to the
north.
Though nominally partners of the Triple
Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the
Italians had declared their neutrality in August
- For the next nine months they were wooed
by both sides. The Italian government in the end
chose war for territorial gain alone, though the
politicians were divided whether or not to go to
war. The government blatantly sought to extract
the best bid, an attitude dignified by Prime
Minister Salandra as conforming to sacro egoismo.
What was decisive for Italy was a determination
to complete its ‘liberation’ and to wrest from
Austria-Hungary the Italian-speaking lands of the
Trentino and Trieste. But its appetite was larger
than this; the Italian government hoped also to
acquire the German-speaking South Tyrol as well
as influence and territory in the Balkans and
Ottoman territory in Asia Minor. The Austrians
felt they were being blackmailed. ‘Against brig-
ands such as the Italians are now, no diplomatic
swindle would be excessive’, secretly wrote the
Austrian prime minister. The Allies offered the
most. In May 1915 the Italians declared war on
Austria-Hungary and so quite unnecessarily
entered a war that was to prove for the Italians
immensely costly in human life and material
resources.
For the Balkan states the Great War provided
an opportunity to start a third Balkan war for
the satisfaction of Balkan territorial ambitions.
Bulgaria in September 1915 joined the war on the
side of Germany and Austria-Hungary with the
promise of large territorial gains, including
Serbian Macedonia. A year later, in August 1916,
Romania was promised by the Allies Romanian-
speaking Transylvania and part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire as well as other territories, and
it declared war to secure them.
In eastern Asia, Japan’s chosen policy was to
strengthen its position in China. It declared war
on Germany in August 1914, captured Germany’s
Chinese colonial sphere and then presented
to China the Twenty-one Demands to assure
itself a predominant position. The war begun by
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France and
Britain for one set of reasons widened to include
other nations, all of whom, with the exception of
the US, saw in it an opportunity for extending
their territorial empires.
In each of the belligerent countries there were
some politicians who, after the failure to win the
war in 1914, looked towards the conclusion of a
compromise peace. But, despite President Wilson’s
efforts to build a bridge between the combatants
through mediation, the generals and the govern-
ments conceived only of a peace ended on the vic-
tor’s terms. This attitude, as much as the outbreak
of the war itself, changed the course of world his-
tory. In Berlin, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg at
times viewed the unfolding drama in terms of
Greek tragedy; it would be disastrous for civilisa-
tion whether Germany won or lost. In victory,