destroy Prussian militarism. The economic imbal-
ance between Germany and France was to be
righted by territorial cessions and by forcing the
Germans to transfer wealth – gold – to France
under the heading of ‘reparations’. Germany
would be made to ‘pay for the war’, to weaken it
and to strengthen its neighbours.
The British approach was more pragmatic,
avoiding commitments as far as possible. There
was no desire whatever to reconstitute Hanover.
Indeed, there were no war aims formulated at all
during the first two years of the war, except for
the restoration of Belgian independence, since
this had been the principal ostensible reason for
going to war. Little thought was given to the
terms to be imposed on defeated Germany, far
more on what favourable inducements might
entice Germany’s allies to abandon it. There was
no desire to break up the Habsburg Empire. But
the one recurring theme, the destruction of the
war spirit of the principal enemy, was frequently
proclaimed. General Sir William Robertson, chief
of the imperial general staff, in a speech to muni-
tion workers in April 1917, summed up this
uncompromising outlook: ‘Our aim is, as I
understand it, to deal German despotism such
a blow as will for generations to come prevent a
recurrence of the horrors of the last two and
a half years.’ But this did not mean exactly what
the Russians and French had in mind. Britain’s
prime minister, Lloyd George, as well as Arthur
Balfour, the foreign secretary, were convinced
that Germany’s great power on the continent
could not be permanently diminished. The best
hope for peace was the emergence of a peaceful
democratic post-war Germany. Thus, Germany
should not be driven to seek revenge to recover
territory won from it. Unjust and harsh treatment
of defeated Germany would only sow the seeds of
future conflict. Britain’s leaders looked to a close
alliance with the US to guarantee the mainten-
ance of peace. Later differences which emerged
with France over the right policy to adopt are
clearly foreshadowed in British war aims. These
were only ‘absolute’ on one point: the security of
the British Empire from any future German chal-
lenge. Germany would not be permitted again to
compete with Britain’s naval supremacy. As for
other war aims, they were to be formulated by
Britain during the war in response to the demands
of allies, or would-be allies, or in pursuit of mili-
tary objectives. The latter led to the encourage-
ment of the Arab revolts against the Turks, for
instance, and so to the post-war transformation of
the Middle East.The attempts of the belligerent nations to win a
decision in 1915 and 1916 all failed at a cost
in human life never before experienced. Both
sides on the western front attempted to break
through the other’s carefully prepared defences.
For the soldiers this meant leaving the security of
their own trench and advancing across a ‘no-
man’s land’ raked by machine-gun fire to the
enemy trench protected by barbed wire and bay-
onets. If you were lucky, artillery had cleared
something of a path before you and disorganised
the defence, but it was rarely totally effective. If
good fortune favoured you, you actually reached
the enemy trench; others only moved a few yards
beyond their own trench before falling to the
enemy fire. French and British offensives were
launched by Joffre and Haig in the spring of- No breakthrough was achieved; the little
territory gained was no compensation for the
appalling losses. In the autumn of 1915 the Allies
renewed their offensive, ending again without
any worthwhile gain; 242,000 men were lost by
the Allies in that autumn offensive alone. New
recruits were nevertheless still increasing the size
of the armies.
On the eastern front German troops in 1915
were now essential to sustain the Austro-
Hungarian front as well as their own. In succes-
sive Austrian and German offensives from January
to September 1915 the Russians suffered heavy
defeats, were driven from all German territory as
well as Habsburg Galicia and gave up a large area
of the Russian Empire including Russian Poland.
The Russian retreat demoralised the army. The
Germans and Austrians captured more than a
million prisoners and the Russians had lost
another million men. But the Russian war effort
was not broken. By enormous effort on the home
industrial front and by the raising of new troops
the Russian front-line strength reached 2 million