once again in 1916. Some 4 million men had by
then been lost. The tsarist government, despite
the vast reserve of population, was incapable of
doing more than making good the losses. The
Russian armies that would by sheer numbers
steamroller over Germany and Austria-Hungary
never materialised in the First World War as they
would in the Second. That nightmare vision for
the Germans, which had been so powerful an
influence on them in deciding for war in 1914,
was illusory.
Before 1915 was ended the first of the nations
to have gone to war in August 1914 was crushed.
Serbia was overwhelmed by a joint Bulgarian,
German and Austrian attack.
The new front created by Italy’s entry into the
war in May 1915 resembled the fighting in France
rather than in Russia. Although the Italians
enjoyed superiority over the Austrians, they suf-
fered heavy casualties in a series of offensives
during the course of 1915 without coming near
to winning any decisive battles or achieving a
breakthrough. Here, too, the short glorious war
that was expected proved an illusion and Italy was
locked in costly battles of attrition. It was easier
to enter the war than to leave it with profit.
The central powers (Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) planned to carry
on the war in 1916 so that through attrition the
enemy would be exhausted. The German com-
mander in the west, General Falkenhayn, calcu-
lated that if the Germans attacked the fortress of
Verdun, then the French would sacrifice their
manpower to hold on to it. This would break
France’s morale.
Verdun became associated with the dogged-
ness of its French hero defender Pétain, who, like
Hindenburg, was to play a critical political role,
for which he was unsuited, in post-war Europe.
Falkenhayn failed to take Verdun or to limit
German casualties by the use of artillery as he had
planned. By the year’s end German casualties – a
third of a million men – were almost as heavy as
the French losses of 362,000 men.
During the summer months until the autumn
of 1916 the British and French armies not com-
mitted to Verdun launched their great offensive
on the Somme intending to bring victory. The
casualties suffered in hurling men against well-
prepared positions were horrifying. The German
army was not beaten but, refusing to yield terri-
tory in tactical withdrawals, also suffered enor-
mous casualties. The French, British and Germans
sacrificed more than a million men. British casu-
alties alone exceeded 400,000, French 190,000
men, and the Germans around 500,000. Still
there was no decision.
The Somme offensive in the west was part of
a co-ordinated inter-Allied plan to attack the
central powers. Only the Russians in 1916 gained
a great victory. General Brusilov’s summer offen-
sive was an overwhelming success, destroying the
independent Austro-Hungarian war effort. The
Austro-Hungarian army lost more than 600,000
men in casualties or as prisoners, the Germans
150,000. But Russia, too, failed to defeat Ger-
many in the east. Russian casualties were heavy
and multiplied during the fighting from August
to September. As it turned out, though no one
expected it at the time, the Brusilov offensive was
to be the last major Russian military effort before
the outbreak of the revolution in Russia. The
central powers did score one easy military success
in the east in 1916 after the halting of the Russian
offensive: the defeat of Romania. Its supplies of
foodstuffs and oil now became available to the
central powers.
While the war was being fought, during the
winter of 1916 and the following spring of 1917,
new forces were at work which changed its course
fundamentally: the intervention of the US and the
Russian Revolution.
1
THE GREAT WAR I 99
