remain free and independent. More important,
the Japanese government itself decided to with-
draw from Siberia and China. The treaties pro-
vided the illusion of peace in eastern Asia without
solving the underlying conflicts, just as the later
Locarno Treaties created the illusion of peace in
Europe. The climax came in 1928 with the
Briand–Kellogg treaty ‘outlawing’ war. They
lulled the West into a false sense of security. No
doubt many people wished to be lulled.
Americans did not speak of ‘isolationism’ in
the 1920s, but of ‘America first’. Even the Mid-
westerner knew that the US could not be separated
from the rest of the world. What Americans
demanded was that in dealings with the rest of the
world it was the duty of Congress and the admin-
istration to take care of American interests and not
to meddle in the world concerns of the League
of Nations. Above all, America should not be
dragged into conflicts by concluding a military
alliance with any other country but should preserve
a ‘free hand’, confident in its ability to defend its
interests. It was an attitude based on confidence.
In fact, the American administrations involved
the US more in problems of international diplo-
macy than the American people would have
approved of.
One aspect of ‘America first’ was the insistence
on collecting all the moneys lent mainly to France
and Britain but also to the other Allies, during
the Great War. Since Europe remained in des-
perate need of American loans, the administration
could pressurise the wartime Allies by closing the
American money market to those nations which
defaulted. One of the curious results of this
outlook was the treatment of Germany. When the
US, at length, concluded a separate peace with its
former enemy, only token reparations were
demanded. Consequently, Germany had free
access to the American money market. American
financial orthodoxy in the 1920s had the effect of
dragging out the reparations problem which did
so much to unsettle Europe.
Americans did play a major role in 1924 and
1930 and gave a lead in sorting out the repara-
tion question, but rejected the British suggestion
that German reparations should be linked to
Allied indebtedness. It would have created a very
much healthier international financial climate if
both large reparations and large debts had been
cancelled altogether. Lessons were learnt only
after the Second World War. A narrow, national-
istic approach to international finance and trade,
in the end, harmed the US as much as it did other
countries, for it contributed to the great collapse
of 1929 and to the depression of the 1930s
and so, indirectly, to the rise of Hitler and the
outbreak of the Second World War.142 THE GREAT WAR, REVOLUTION AND THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY
Principal Allied debtors and creditors, November 1918 (millions of dollars)Owed to US Owed to Britain Owed to France Total debt Total due
US – – – – 7,078
Britain 3,696 – – 3,696 7,014
France 1,970 1,683 – 3,653 2,237
Russia 188 2,472 955 3,615 –
Italy 1,031 1,855 75 2,961 –
Belgium 172 434 535 1,141 –
Other states 21 570 672 1,263 –