often asked, are in fact somewhat unreal. What
mattered to Mussolini now that he had attained
power was to retain as much of it personally in his
hands for as long as possible. He had no principles
or methods and despite talk of a new corporative
state, all relationships with existing institutions and
organisations possessing some power in the state
were subordinated to his will. His own Fascist
backers in this sense posed as much of an obstacle
to him as political opponents, the monarchy, the
papacy, the army and the bureaucracy. ‘Policy’ was
what Mussolini felt best served his interests in
dealing with every group.
Did Mussolini establish a ‘totalitarian’ regime?
The monarchy was preserved, and the Church and
the armed forces enjoyed some independence,
while the independence of parliament was virtually
destroyed. But Mussolini avoided a sudden revo-
lutionary break; he allowed some degree of inde-
pendence, believing this to serve his interests. He
lacked in any case the iron will, utter ruthlessness
and total inhumanity of Hitler. Rather than make
the Fascist Party supreme, Mussolini preferred to
leave some delegated power in the hands of rival
interest groups so that his task of domination
would be made easier. Mussolini understood in
his early years, before self-delusion blinded him,
that some voluntary limits on his exercise of
power would make him more acceptable and so
strengthen his hold over government. The duce
was a complex character whose undoubted arro-
gance and insensitivity was complemented by
intelligence and unusual political skill.
In October 1922 Mussolini made himself the
head of a government which looked not so dif-
ferent to previous government coalitions based on
personal bargaining. Included were the Catholics
and Conservatives. Mussolini, in addition to
holding the premiership, was also minister of the
interior and his own foreign minister. He won an
overwhelming vote of confidence in parliament
for this government. His objective of breaking the
political power of other parties by inveigling the
majority to cooperate with him in national tasks
was attained slowly but surely. When he felt suf-
ficiently strong and secure, he backed a Fascist bill
for parliamentary ‘reform’, the Acerbo Bill. In
place of proportional representation this bill
established that the party gaining most votes (as
long as these amounted to at least 25 per cent of
the total) should automatically secure two-thirds
of all the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Since
the Fascists were infiltrating and taking over the
provincial administrations, they would be able to
ensure in any case that more than a quarter of the
votes were cast for the list of government candi-
dates. The bill passed in November 1923 made
certain that Mussolini would have at his disposal
a permanent majority of deputies ready to do his
will. The morale of any intending opposition
parties was consequently undermined. Intimida-
tion played its part in persuading the deputies
lamely to consent to Mussolini’s retention of
power by legal and constitutional means. He
always hinted he could act differently, especially
as he now had a private army, the former Fascist
bands, which had been transformed into a volun-
tary militia of national security paid for by the
state and swearing allegiance to the duce, not
the king.
The elections of April 1924 were a triumph for
Mussolini. Intimidation and corruption to a
degree not practised before secured for his
candidates two-thirds of all the votes cast. The
year 1924 was the last, nevertheless, in which
Mussolini could have been driven from power.
There was a feeling of revulsion in the country
when a socialist deputy, Giacomo Matteotti, was
murdered by a Fascist gang after he had attacked
the corrupt elections in parliament. Mussolini was
taken aback by the sense of outrage; he was
accused in parliament in June 1924 of being an
accomplice to murder, and a group of opposition
deputies withdrew in protest. But the king did
nothing. Mussolini rode out this, his first and last
serious storm before his fall in 1943. In 1926 his
regime became more openly totalitarian with the
suppression of the free press.
Just as Mussolini did not wish to be depend-
ent on a genuine representative assembly, so he
did not intend to be at the mercy of Fascist fol-
lowers more revolutionary than he. In December
1922 he created a Grand Council of Fascism over
which he presided and which he dominated. In
October 1926 it was the turn of the independ-
ence of the Fascist Party to be undermined; all