increasing shortages of goods led to multi-pricing
of the same goods in ‘commercial’ shops or at arti-
ficially low prices but strictly rationed. Despite
rises in wages the actual cost of living rose much
more steeply. By 1933 living standards had
declined precipitously. While there was none of
the unemployment that plagued Western econ-
omies at the time, the great industrial leap forward
was accompanied by mass misery and hunger.
A ‘maximum’ version of the First Five-Year
Plan was adopted by the Sixteenth Party Congress
in 1929. Industrial output was intended to
increase more than twofold and agricultural
output to rise by half. The industrial growth actu-
ally achieved fell far short of such unrealisable
targets. In trying to fulfil them there was huge
waste and confusion. Coercion and regulation
were necessary means to drive industrialisation
forward especially in the primitive regions of
Russia, the Urals and Siberia, where for military
strategic reasons new industrial complexes were
set up. The emphasis was on heavy industry, iron
and steel, and machinery. The First Five-Year
Plan, declared to be fulfilled a year in advance,
actually fell short of its target in most industrial
sections. But great iron and steel works were
being constructed, the gigantic Dnieper dam was
built and the engineering industry greatly
expanded. The basis of a modern industry had
been constructed.
The Second Five-Year Plan (1933–7) brought
improvements for the Russian people. The eco-
nomic sacrifices demanded of the people were not
as harsh and there was greater emphasis on pro-
ducing goods for consumption. Planning became
more efficient and a greater self-sufficiency was
achieved. After 1937 the massive switch to arms
production once more created new bottlenecks
and shortages. Control over the labour force
became much harsher. Workers were tied in 1940
to their place of work and absenteeism became a
crime. Industrially the Soviet Union, in a decade
and a half, had been transformed and proved
strong enough to withstand the shock of the
German invasion. Statistics should always be con-
sidered with caution and this is especially true of
Soviet statistics. But the figures shown in the table
indicate and reflect the change of Soviet Russia’s
industry. Whether Soviet statistics are to be relied
on is an open question.
The results were in any case impressive, the
human cost equally enormous. Enthusiasm for
building socialism was replaced by terror and
coercion. Ideals of socialist equality did not
inhibit Stalin from decreeing differential rewards.
With much stick, and the carrot of high rewards
for successful skilled piecework, he drove the
mass of new peasant workers in industry to pull
Russia out of the morass. Socialism could not be
built in a society predominantly peasant and back-
ward, Stalin believed. Nor could a backward
Soviet Union survive, surrounded as it was by
enemies. But the arbitrary murderous excesses of
Stalin’s rule in the 1930s bear no relation to the
achievement of such goals. On the contrary, they
gravely jeopardised progress. In dealing with the
peasantry and agriculture his policies led to disas-
ter. Here, the ‘revolution from above’ not only
inflicted enormous hardship on the majority of
the population, the peasantry, but also failed in
1
SOVIET RUSSIA 175
Soviet Russia’s industrial growth
1928 1940 1950
Electricity (milliard kWh) 5.0 48.3 91.2
Steel (million metric tons) 4.3 18.3 27.3
Oil (million metric tons) 11.6 31.1 37.9
Coal (million metric tons) 35.5 166.0 261.1
Machine-tools (thousands) 2.0 58.4 70.6
Tractors (thousands) 1.3 31.6 116.7
Mineral fertiliser (million metric tons) 0.1 3.2 5.5
Leather footwear (million pairs) 58.0 211.0 203.0
