Hindenburg did not want Hitler to come to
power. He felt a strong antipathy for the
‘Bohemian corporal’ (he was actually a Bavarian
corporal), a violent uncouth Austrian who shared
none of Hindenburg’s own Prussian Junker qual-
ities. When Hindenburg was elected president in
1925 by a narrow margin over the candidate of
the Socialists and Centre, the spectacle of an
avowed monarchist and legendary war hero, the
most decorated and honoured of the kaiser’s
field marshals, heading a republic seemed incon-
gruous indeed. But the 77-year-old symbol of
past glories did his job decently enough, even
raising the respectability of the Republic by con-
senting to serve as its head. But all his life he had
been trained to believe in command and leader-
ship, and the spectacle of parliamentary bickering
and the musical chairs the politicians were playing
in and out of government appeared to him a trav-
esty of what Germany needed.
Nevertheless, the field marshal could be relied
on to honour his oath to the republican constitu-
tion. This gave him the constitutional right to act
in an emergency, and he believed, not without jus-
tification, that the destructive behaviour of the
political parties during the economic crisis of 1929
to 1930 had created a crisis of government. The
Young Plan, which fixed the total amount of repa-
rations at 121 thousand million marks to be paid
in instalments over fifty-nine years, was assailed by
the Nazis and the right. In 1932, however, at
Lausanne, the amount was reduced to 3,000 mil-
lion marks. Brüning’s attempt to court Nationalist
opinion and aid the stricken economy by announc-
ing an Austro-German customs union in 1931
failed because the Allies declared that it broke the
Versailles Treaty, which prohibited the union of
Austria and Germany. Thus, dissatisfied, German
nationalism was further increased. The army now
enjoyed great influence and the attention of histor-
ians has been especially focused on the few men,
including Hindenburg’s son, who increasingly
gained the old gentleman’s confidence and influ-
enced his decisions.
Brüning governed with austere authority,
integrity and disastrous results. Raising taxes and
reducing salaries was naturally unpopular, all the
more so as the economic crisis deepened.
Unemployment rose from 2.25 million in 1930
to over 6 million in 1932. Brüning in April 1932
tried to curb street violence by banning all the
private armies such as the SA, the SS and the
Stahlhelm. His intentions were good but this
measure, too, was largely ineffectual as the organ-
isations survived without openly wearing uni-
forms. At the depth of the crisis in 1932 the
presidential term of office expired. Hindenburg
was deeply chagrined not to be re-elected unop-
posed. Hitler chose to stand against him and lost,
but more significant than his failure was the fact
that more than 13 million had voted for him.
Hindenburg had secured over 19 million votes
but was so old that he could not last much longer.
Shortly after the presidential elections in May
1932 Hindenburg dropped Brüning. Franz von
Papen became chancellor, enjoying no support in
the Reichstag or the country. Less than a year was
left before Hitler assumed power over Germany.
How had he, a complete unknown only eleven
years earlier, achieved this transformation?
Fewer than three out of every hundred
Germans voted for the Nazis at the national elec-
tion of 1928 and that was after seven years of
unceasing Nazi propaganda. But the Nazis had
built an organisational base and increased the
party’s membership significantly. Nazi ideology
was no consistent or logically developed theory
such as Marxism claimed to be. There was
nothing original about any of its aspects. It incor-
porated the arrogant nationalistic and race ideas
of the nineteenth century, specifically the anti-
Semitic doctrines and the belief in German
uniqueness and Germany’s world mission,
together with elements of fascism and socialism,
for in its early days the National Socialist Workers’
Party wooed the urban worker.The National Socialists, or Nazis for short, had
grown out of one of the many small racialist and
nationalist groups already flourishing in Germany- one organised in Munich by a man called Anton
Drexler. His name would have remained insignif-
icant but for Hitler’s association with the group.
Under Hitler’s leadership from July 1921
onwards, the party was opportunistic, seeking to
grow strong on all the resentments felt by differ-