adopting such a ruthless style of warfare within
the range of Western cameramen.
When the League of Nations met to consider
China’s appeal immediately after the Japanese
launched their operation in Manchuria, public
opinion in the West sided with China. There was
an element of wishful thinking that the League of
Nations would be able to punish the aggressor by
using the machinery of sanctions set up to provide
for collective security. Governments were urged
to support the League. But the League of Nations
could not fulfil such unrealistic expectations. To
oppose Japan by military force on the Chinese
mainland would have required an enormous mil-
itary effort. Who would be ready in the midst of
deep depression to raise and supply the large
armies? Alternatively, by a great effort and with
large funds the Chinese armies might be better
equipped and led. Germany was doing all it could
in providing military advice to Chiang Kai-shek’s
forces. The political divisions of China, however,
made it difficult in 1932 and 1933 to conceive of
any effective check on Japan.
The British Foreign Office and the American
State Department had a more realistic appreciation
of the situation. With so much at stake, the British
attitude to Japan was ambiguous. Chinese nation-
alism threatened Britain’s imperialist interests as
much as Japan’s. In the US it was clear from the
start that American material interests were not suf-
ficient to justify the possibility of conflict with
Japan or even a trade embargo, which would have
deeply injured Japan. That remained the view of
official America throughout the 1930s. Yet there
was a genuine sense of outrage that Japan had
offended against the ethical code that should dic-
tate how it was to conduct its relations with neigh-
bours. It had broken solemn treaties, and this was
to be condemned. Secretary of State Henry
Stimson issued a famous statement on 7 January
1932 that became known as the Stimson Doctrine
- much to President Hoover’s chagrin since, he
claimed, he had first thought of it. The US, it
declared, would not recognise any treaties or situ-
ations brought about in violation of earlier treaties.
The US thus refused to accept all Japanese
attempts to regularise its control of Manchuria.
The League endorsed this view a little later.
Meanwhile, the League of Nations had sent
Lord Lytton as British chairman of a commission
to investigate on the spot Chinese claims and
Japanese counter-claims. His report in October
1932 condemned the Japanese military action
and suggested a compromise solution that would
have given Manchuria autonomy while preserv-
ing Japanese rights. In February 1933 these rec-
ommendations were accepted by the League
Assembly; the Japanese delegation thereupon left
the League and never returned. The League of
Nations had nothing more to offer in the absence
of will on the part of Britain and the US to back
further action. The League suffered greatly in
prestige. This, in itself, did not bring a general
war between the other powers nearer; indeed, it
might have served a useful purpose if the peoples
in the democratic countries had thereby gained a
greater sense of realism. Too often the call to
‘support the League’ was believed to be all that
was required; it could be comfortably combined
with pacifism and a refusal to ‘fight for king and
country’. Many preferred to believe that they did
not need to shoulder the responsibilities of peace-
keeping or make the sacrifices required to check
aggression – that was the job of the League. An
ardent desire for peace and wishful thinking led
to blame being transferred to the League.
In Japan itself the success of the Kwantung
army and the failure of the League had import-
ant effects too. A wave of patriotism and ultra-
nationalism swept the population. Japanese
governments now seemed to those Japanese patri-
ots much too cautious. Patriotic secret societies,
with sometimes only a few hundred members,
sought to influence policy decisively. One method
was to assassinate ministers who, in the societies’
view, did not follow patriotic policies. Frustrated
army officers joined such societies and there were
repeated attempts to stage military coups. Several
prominent ministers were murdered. This reign of
terror did succeed in intimidating many oppo-
nents of extremism. The army meanwhile did not
try to put its own house in order – at least not
until several hundred officers and rebellious
troops in February 1936 had seized the whole
government quarter of Tokyo and assassinated a
number of Cabinet ministers, in the name of the