In chess what matters is the result, the endgame.
The opening moves and the middle play are all
directed to achieving such a superiority of posi-
tion that the endgame is preordained, the anni-
hilation of the opponent. The analogy holds for
Hitler’s foreign policy. Much confusion of inter-
pretation is avoided if one essential point is
grasped: Hitler never lost sight of his goal – wars
of conquest that would smash Soviet Russia, and
subordinate France and the smaller states of the
continent of Europe to the domination of a new
Germany. This new order would be based on the
concept of race. ‘Races’ such as the Jews were so
poisonous that there was literally no place for
them in this new Europe. Other inferior races
would be handled ruthlessly: the Slavs unless they
sided with Hitler would not be permitted any
national existence and could only hope for a
servile status under their Aryan masters. Logically,
this biological foreign policy could not be con-
fined to Europe alone. From the mastery of the
European continent, the global conflict would
ensue. Hitler was vague about details; this would
be a task for his successors and future generations.
But he took some interest in German relations
with Japan in the 1930s because he recognised
that Japan’s war in Asia and threat to British
interests could be exploited. He preferred to con-
centrate on the ‘limited’ task of gaining mastery
of the European continent.
It is interesting to compare Hitler’s aims with
those of his Weimar and Wilhelmine predecessors.
The desire for predominance on the continent of
Europe was shared by both Wilhelmine Germany
in 1914 and Hitler’s Germany of the 1930s. The
foreign policy of Weimar’s Germany, like Hitler’s
included secret rearmament and the objective of
restoring German military power by abolishing
the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of
Versailles. Furthermore, Weimar’s foreign policy
was ultimately directed towards recovering the
territories lost to Poland. Differences between
Hitler’s policy and earlier policies are also very
evident. Wilhelmine Germany was brought to the
point of launching war only after years of trying
to avoid such a war. An alternative to war was
always considered both possible and desirable.
War would become unnecessary if the alliance
between France and Russia ‘encircling’ Germany
could have been broken by the threat of force
alone. Even when Wilhelmine Germany made
peace plans in the autumn of 1914 in the flush of
early victories, the German leaders did not con-
template the enslavement of peoples or mass
murder. Wilhelmine Germany’s vision was a
utopian one of a prosperous Europe led by a pow-
erful Germany. Of course what appeared as utopia
to the German leaders, a Pax Germanica, was
intolerable to its neighbours.
When we next contrast Hitler’s aims with
those of Stresemann the differences are equally
great. Weimar Germany was not bent on either
racialist barbarism or continental domination. The
reconciliation with France was genuine, as wasChapter 19
THE CRUMBLING PEACE, 1933–6