Stresemann’s assumption that another European
war with France and Britain would spell Ger-
many’s ruin. A realistic objective, he believed, was
for Germany to recover the position it had held as
a great power before 1914. To strive for more was
to make the mistake that had led other powers to
combine against imperial Germany and so had
brought about the catastrophic defeat of Ger-
many and the harsh peace. The essence then of
Stresemann’s diplomacy was to win as much for
Germany as possible without provoking the slight-
est chance of war. It followed that this ‘weapon’
was to make repeated pleas for trust and reconcil-
iation. He conducted Weimar’s diplomacy with
skill and success, overcoming many difficulties.
Tragically, it was Hitler who became the heir of
Germany’s much improved international position;
furthermore, he derided Weimar’s achievements
as the work of the ‘November criminals’.
It is commonplace since the publication of
A. J. P. Taylor’s The Origins of the Second World
Warto discredit the findings of the Nürnberg
War Crimes Tribunal that Hitler and his associ-
ates carefully and precisely planned their aggres-
sions culminating in the attack on Poland in
September 1939. It is true that Hitler was fol-
lowing no such precise and detailed plan of
aggression. He clearly reacted to events and, as
the documents show, was ready at times to be
flexible when it came to timing and detail. After
all he could not disregard contemporary circum-
stances or the policies of the other powers, nor
could he foretell what opportunities would arise
for Germany to exploit.
But all this does not lead to the opposite con-
clusion that he had no plan. No one can read
Mein Kampf, or his other writings and the exist-
ing documents expressing his views, without
being struck by their general consistency. His
actions, moreover, conformed to the broad plans
he laid down. This was no mere coincidence.
Unlike his predecessors, Hitler was working
towards one clear goal: a war, or several wars,
which would enable Germany to conquer the
continent of Europe. Once a dictator has acquired
sufficient power internally there is nothing diffi-
cult about launching a war. The difficulty lies in
winning it, and in getting right the timing of
aggression. The task of preserving peace, of
solving conflicts, of deciding when war cannot be
avoided because of the ambitions and aggressions
of other nations – that requires skill and good
judgement. Hitler was not prepared to compro-
mise his ultimate goal. Only to a very limited
degree, was he prepared to modify the steps by
which he intended to attain this goal. Hitler
showed a greater degree of skill as a propagandist
by hiding his true objectives for a time when in
power. His repeated assurances that he was
making his ‘last territorial demands’ fooled some
people abroad, as well as the majority of Germans,
who certainly did not imagine they would be led
again into another war against Britain, France,
Russia and the US.
Why were Hitler and resurgent Germany not
stopped before German power had become so
formidable that it was too late, except at the cost
of a devastating war? There can be little doubt
that British and French policy between the wars
and, more especially, in the 1930s was disastrous.
But the real interest of these years lies in the con-
trast between a single-minded Hitler bent on a
war of conquest from the start and the reaction
of his neighbours who were uncertain of his ulti-
mate intentions, who had to grapple with the
problem of how best to meet ill-defined dangers
abroad, while facing economic and social difficul-
ties at home. The leaders of the Western democ-
racies, moreover, were incessantly concerned with
the problems of domestic political rivalries and
divisions within their own parties. In France polit-
ical divisions had escalated into violence and
greatly weakened the capacity of unstable gov-
ernments to respond decisively to the German
danger. In the circumstances it is perhaps all the
more remarkable that a real attempt on the level
of diplomacy was made by the French to check
Hitler. In Britain, despite the overwhelming par-
liamentary strength won by the nationalist gov-
ernment in 1931, continuing widespread distress
and unemployment gave the Conservatives much
cause for concern from an electoral point of view.
Foreign policy also played a considerable role
in the November election of 1935. Baldwin
reflected the public mood by simultaneously
expressing Conservative support for the League of
1
THE CRUMBLING PEACE, 1933–6 205
